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Abstract
Companies are increasingly confronted with fast-changing risk-situations, leading to
substantial challenges for business continuity and resilience professionals. Furthermore,
the growing availability needs and the dependence on providers and suppliers demand an
effective and efficient response to disruptions and interruptions in order to protect the brand,
reputation and financial objectives of an organization.
As the preparation for ’expecting the unexpected’ can be very costly, it is essential to
highlight the benefits and advantages brought by proper business continuity planning. This
thesis contributes to current research ambitions by presenting a formal approach extending
the capabilities of risk-aware business process management. Risk aware business process
management in general bridges the gap between the business process management, risk
management and business continuity management domain. The presented extension within
the thesis enables the consideration of resource allocation aspects within the risk-aware
business process modeling and simulation. Through this extension it is possible to evaluate
the effects of workarounds and resource re-allocations which is one crucial part in business
continuity plans. In order to test the feasibility we implemented a prototype of our formal
model using Simulink.
Additionally, in this work, we introduce a business continuity meta-model which
is capable to capture essential business continuity requirements. The meta-model was
implemented as a project within the OpenModels Initative.
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Kurzfassung
Die rasch ändernden Risikobedingungen, mit denen sich Unternehmen heutzutage
konfrontiert sehen, stellen Business Continuity und Resilience Verantwortliche vor
neue Herausforderungen. Durch die zunehmende Abhängigkeit von Lieferanten und
Geschäftspartnern sowie steigende Verfügbarkeitsanforderungen von Services wird es
immer bedeutsamer, eine effektive und effiziente Reaktion auf Störungen und Ausfälle zur
Verfügung zu stellen, um Ruf und Marke zu schützen sowie finanzielle Ziele zu erreichen.
Da die Vorbereitung und Planung einer Reaktion auf unvorhergesehene Ereignisse
äus¨serst kostenintensiv sein kann, ist es notwendig, die Vorteile eines effizienten
Notfallmanagements (Business Continuity Managements) nachvollziehbar zu begründen.
Der in dieser Arbeit vorgestellte Ansatz erweitert das Konzept des Risk-Aware
Business Process Managements, um Auswirkungen von Workarounds und dynamischen
Ressourcenzuweisungen zu analysieren. Die Ergebnisse dieser Analyse dienen als
signifikanter Input für die Notfallplanung. Für die Evaluierung des Ansatzes wurde ein
Simulink Prototyp entwickelt.
Zusätzlich wird ein Metamodell zur Abbildung und Erfassung von Business Continuity
Anforderungen, welches auf Basis der OpenModels Plattform umgesetzt worden ist,
vorgestellt.
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Introduction
The journey of ten thousand miles begins with the first step.
Lao Tse
Events interrupting or disrupting business operations, such as natural disasters (e.g.,
earthquakes in Japan 2011 [6], closed airports due to Eyjafjallajoekull [87]), and targeted
cyber attacks (e.g., Stuxnet 2010 [75]) are omnipresent in our media. “Whilst bombs, fires
and floods capture the headlines almost 90% of business-threatening incidents are ’quiet
catastrophes’ which go unreported in the media but can have a devastating impact on an
organisation’s ability to function.” [15, p. 5] These “quiet catastrophes” can occur in various
ways. Examples [48, p. 4] are information security incidents, loss of utilities and services
or deliberate disruption.
Is security aligned with business strategy and processes? What types of workarounds
achieve the best results? How should the response to a disruption look like? What kind of
cross-skill trainings are needed for whom? These questions play a central role in today’s
business life. However the answer to these questions is anything but simple.
The high relevance of the problem is also illustrated in a study by Knight and Pretty
[73, pp. 3-5], who found out that there is a strong relationship between the incident
response/business continuity and the shareholder value.
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The reasons stated above are only a few indicators why Business Continuity Management
(BCM) and Business Resilience (BR) are increasingly being used on a wider scale. [16, p.
4] [113, p.7] According to a study [114] conducted by the Chartered Management Institute
(CMI), 84% of the companies that had activated their continuity plans agreed that they had
reduced the impacts of disruption effectively. Possible sources for disruptions have been
surveyed by [114]. The results for the time period 2002 - 2011 are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Disruptions experienced 2002-2011 / Threats addressed
by BCM 2011 [114, p.10]
Disruptions experienced in previous years Covered
by
BCM
2002
%
2003
%
2004
%
2005
%
2006
%
2007
%
2008
%
2009
%
2010
%
2011
%
2011
%
Extreme
weather e.g.
flood / high
winds
18 15 10 18 9 28 29 25 58 64 45
Loss of IT 19 24 25 41 38 39 43 40 35 34 52
Loss of people - 26 20 28 29 32 35 24 28 34 35
Transport
disruption
- - - - - - - - 22 30 28
Loss of access
to site
5 5 6 11 13 13 16 13 22 26 50
Loss of tele-
communications
- - 23 28 24 25 30 23 20 20 46
Supply chain
disruption
19 11 12 10 10 13 12 9 13 19 26
Loss of key
skills
33 16 14 20 19 20 21 14 15 18 30
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School /
childcare
closures
- - - - - - - - 18 17 12
Loss of
electricity / gas
- - - - - - - - 15 16 43
Employee
health & safety
incident
13 9 8 19 13 17 17 16 14 15 32
Negative
publicity /
coverage
24 17 16 17 16 19 18 14 9 11 20
Damage to
corporate
image /
reputation /
brand
15 7 8 11 8 11 10 11 7 10 24
Loss of water /
sewerage
- - - - - - - - 6 9 36
Customer
health /
product safety
incident
11 6 4 6 6 6 7 4 6 7 24
Environmental
incident
9 5 4 7 5 6 7 7 5 7 34
Pressure group
protest
10 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 6 6 13
Industrial
action
- - - 5 6 7 7 7 4 6 20
Fire 6 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 4 4 45
Malicious
cyber attack
- - - - - - - - - 4 25
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Terrorist
damage
2 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 1 2 35
Although security is indispensable for every company to stay compliant with regulatory and
legislative requirements, the utmost objective of every organization is to effectively and efficiently
execute their processes to fulfill their vision and mission goals. While the visions and goals of every
company vary, two characteristics remain stable. Firstly, business processes should be designed in a
way that ensures commercial success, secondly, the executed tasks should be continuously available,
protected against information security risks and compliant with the organization’s governance
requirements and standards.
A lot of work has been done to address both perspectives. However, most research focuses
on solely one area. The business process perspective is mainly covered by process re-engineering
approaches such as [68, pp. 81-106][70, pp. 10-13][96, pp. 376-389]. These approaches analyze
processes to improve their design and to increase their level of automation. A tool that is often used
to find potential improvements is business process simulation which enables the process architect to
validate the design beforehand. When analyzing existing published work [64, 60], we have identified
an essential shortcoming regarding the integration of security aspects which can play a crucial
role in assigning resources. The reason for the importance of integrating security aspects is that
requirements can change rapidly in the face of threats.
Security and continuity relevant aspects are mostly addressed separately. A very significant
amount of time in different departments is spent carrying out tasks that ensure security and continuity.
Disciplines and domains coping with these aspects comprise risk management [55, 80, 82, 83, 1,
23], business continuity management [10, 11, 14, 51, 79, 78, 24] and security incident/problem
management [81, 112]. As in the process domain a lot of research efforts have been carried out
in the last decades leading to a variety of different tools, techniques and approaches. However, a
common reasoning and information framework that links both worlds is still missing. Therefore,
we introduced a novel approach integrating a risk view into business process management which
subsequently enables the simulation of risks within business process simulations [64, 60, 62]. This
extension is the rationale of this thesis.
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4.1 Problem Statement
Resources are the central element in every company to ensure that business operations and processes
can be properly performed. Business processes and information are the key assets of every company.
The intense global competition forces companies to economically optimize their business processes.
For this reason there exist a variety of approaches and techniques to improve business operations.
A well-established approach to improve processes regarding their efficiency is to perform business
process management. The significance of this domain is highlighted by Gartner [41]. Driven by this
need, approaches such as event-driven process chains [96, pp. 376-389] or the Business Process
Management System [68, pp. 81-106] have been introduced and further developed.
Furthermore, regulatory and legislative requirements, such as SOX [88] and the 8th Audit
Directive of the European Union [36], lead to growing demand for an integrated solution that
combines compliance and security issues with business process management. A central element
for the success of a company is the secure and continuous execution of their core processes and
activities. According to the CA research report ’The avoidable cost of downtime’ companies estimate
that revenue is reduced by a third when business critical systems suffer an interruption. [17, p.2, p.8].
Another study of CMI (Chartered Management Institute) outlines in their BCM report that “over the
past year, 40 per cent of organizations suffered disruption due to a loss of IT. Other key sources of
disruption were extreme weather, loss of people, loss of telecommunications, and utility outages.”
[115, p.2]
Risk management, security management and business continuity management pursue the aim
to achieve the objective of protecting information and ensure continuous operation within an
organization. However, as the boundaries are fuzzy “it is very difficult to isolate all the disciplines
related to planning for and recovering from an incident which threatens an organization either from
an internal or external source. All the disciplines are closely related and there are areas of crossover
[...]” [37]
When combining these closely related disciplines with business process management, it gets
even more difficult and complex, as different stakeholder groups such as decision makers, business
process owners, re-engineering professionals as well as business continuity experts use different tools
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and techniques to fulfill their tasks. Consequently, there is no common language or well-established
fully integrated approach that supports security and continuity aspects on the one side and the
economic perspective on the other side. Another problem arises from the different perspectives of the
disciplines. One such example is the operation of redundant resources. While redundant resources
are highly recommended with respect to continuity aspects, it can generate a cost saving position
from an economical viewpoint. This simple example already shows one challenge in the research
ambitions related to business process security.
Currently, traditional business process management and simulation in general neglect the
importance of the exchange of resources between processes during an incident (in the sense of IT
contingency planning) to minimize the damage to a company. During an incident, however, this
prompt re-allocation can make the difference between a successful and a failed response to an
incident.
The research problem, addressed by this thesis, is therefore the question how to eliminate
these shortcomings by integrating aspects of incident/business continuity management into business
process management, thus leading to a novel and more holistic methodology. The following research
questions should be answered by the thesis:
How can a methodology and/or framework combine security disciplines (such as business
continuity) with business process management?
How can this framework improve the planning phase of business continuity and security
incident management by evaluating dynamic allocations of resources? Which techniques are
necessary to achieve this support?
The research questions in a broader sense pursues the aim to improve business continuity
management systems(BCMS) by contributing to the evaluation of response processes and
workarounds. Designing workarounds is one of the major steps of business continuity in order to
diminish the negative effects of disasters and catastrophic events. The fact that the proper design of a
workaround can decide over the existence of a company highlights the relevance of the problem.
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4.2 Contribution and Research Approach
The objective of this thesis is to introduce the reader into the research field of risk-aware business
process management which combines research elements from the domain of business process
management, business continuity management, risk management and other security related
disciplines.
The thesis presents the following main contributions:
A literature review about the state of the art in the domain of business process security.
A novel approach to integrate resource allocation perspectives into risk-aware business process
management. The extension establishes a common model for business and security disciplines
representing knowledge of both worlds as a basis to improve the decision basis for the planning
of resource allocations as part of incident response planning.
Design and implementation of a proof-of-concept-prototype in order to test the feasibility.
The interaction and interdependencies between business processes, activities and resources pose
an enormous challenge. In order to overcome this complexity a modeling and simulation approach is
used. In our approach activities are expressed by a completion function that determines how a task
is accomplished. External factors such as threats can influence the functionality of resources or the
execution of activities.
The selected research method comprises the following main steps and was influenced by the
design research approach of [46].
The first step was to find a research problem with high relevance. For this reason an intensive
effort was put into a literature review that analyzed the current state of research in the domain of
business process security. The focus of the review was put on possible extensions regarding planning
and design stages (phases with utmost relevance for researchers and practitioners in this area). After
having formulated the research question, as immediate step thereafter, the approach was discussed
with domain-experts at important international conferences.
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As a next step, we identified requirements that should be fulfilled by our approach for evaluation
and design purposes.
Within the design step, we solved two main challenges. Firstly, we developed a novel approach
that supports the design and implementation of workarounds (in particular resource allocation) using
risk-aware business process management. Secondly, we developed a meta-model and the architecture
for our proof-of-concept prototype to suit the theoretical framework.
In the implementation phase we realized the meta-model using the OpenModels platform [71].
We decided to use Simulink for simulation purposes.
In the evaluation we modeled a simplified sample business process derived from a real world
example in order to show the applicability of the approach. Furthermore, we presented our approach
at various conferences and workshops to disseminate our method ([64, 60, 43, 102, 104, 62, 101])
and to get feedback about the method.
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4.3 Terminology
In this section we cover some important terms related to risk and business continuity management in
order to clarify their usage within his work.
Risk
“The combination of the probability of an event and its consequence.” [54] For information security
risk the ISO27005 [55] refines this definition by adding the vulnerability component. “Potential that
a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets and thereby cause harm to the
organisation”[55] In this thesis the definition of [54] is predominantly used. However, when it comes
to the consideration of threats, countermeasures and their interdependencies related to business
process activities the definition of [55] helps to get a deeper understanding.
Risk Assessment
“A process used to identify and evaluate risks and their potential effects.” [52]
Risk Management
“Risk management is a systematic approach for minimizing exposure to potential losses. It provides
a disciplined environment for
continuously assessing what could go wrong (i.e., assessing risks)
determining which risks to address (i.e., setting mitigation priorities)
implementing actions to address high-priority risks and bring those risks within tolerance
”[2, p.6]
Resilience
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines resilience as “the ability to
quickly adapt and recover from any known or unknown changes to the environment through holistic
implementation of risk management, contingency, and continuity planning.”[98]
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Business Continuity Management
The London Resilience Team defines business continuity management as planning to ensure that an
organization “[...] has a relatively quick and painless return to ’business as usual’ in the event of
a major disruption.”[74] This brief and simple definition highlights a central element of this thesis,
namely the planning factor to prevent business from suffering irreversible damage. This planning
stage should be improved through the analysis of dynamic resource allocations within risk-aware
business process management. A more comprehensive definition can be found in [99] which states
that “Business Continuity Management (BCM) is a holistic process that identifies potential threats
to an organization and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if realized, might cause.
It provides a framework for building organizational resilience with the capability for an effective
response that safeguards the interests of key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating
activities.” [99]
The Australian Prudential Standard APS 232 summarizes all essential aspects of BCM in a
nutshell. ´´Business continuity management (BCM) describes a whole of business approach to
ensure critical business functions can be maintained, or restored in a timely fashion, in the event of
material disruptions arising from internal or external events. Its purpose is to minimise the financial,
legal, reputational and other material consequences arising from the disruption.”[3]
Business Process
Weske [111] defines business process as “... a set of activities that are performed in coordination in
an organizational or technical environment ...”[111, p. 5] The execution of activities is performed to
achieve business goals and objectives. Furthermore, processes have the ability to interact with each
other. [111]
Business Process Management
Business Process Management includes according to [111] “... concepts, methods and techniques to
support the design, administration, configuration, enactment and analysis of business processes.”[111,
p. 5]
Business Process Re-engineering
The essential phases of a re-engineering process can be found in [68, 106]. Tsalgatidou and Junginger
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highlight in their work [106] the following four sub-processes within the re-engineering process:
Goal Definition, Information Acquisition, Modeling and Evaluation. The phases of the operational
model presented in [68] introduce the following core tasks within the re-engineering phase: criteria
selection, information acquisition, analysis, design, evaluation and implementation. Figure 4.1
schematically outlines the operational model of the re-engineering process.
Figure 4.1: Re-engineering Process [68]
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4.4 Structure
The core parts of this thesis are structured as follows: Chapter 5 highlights related research
approaches that are of high importance for this thesis. It outlines fundamental approaches in the
domain of modeling and simulation of business processes as well as scheduling patterns for workflow
and business process management. Chapter 6 introduces our approach to risk-aware business
process management. This approach integrates risk aspects into business process management
which allows us to consider economic and security perspectives simultaneously.Furthermore,
it highlights the extensions of our approach in order to support the analysis of workarounds
(Section 6.3 - Section 6.6). These extensions enable effective response planning through the
simulation of resource allocation effects. Chapter 7 outlines our prototype architecture before
the results of our approach are discussed. Chapter 8 describes the meta model of our risk-aware
business process management approach including the extension regarding resource allocations.
The last chapter of this thesis (Chapter 9) concludes this work and highlights open resource questions.
Parts of this thesis have been excerpted from the previously published papers
[64, 43, 102, 60, 104, 58, 62, 61, 63, 101, 103]. The chapter 6 of this thesis is partly co-written with
Mag. Stefan Jakoubi [59] as the contents of these parts have been derived from jointly written papers
[64, 43, 102, 60, 104, 62] and describe our approach to risk-aware business process management
which is the foundation of this thesis.
The major contribution of this thesis is the significant extension of risk-aware business process
management in order to facilitate the planning phase of business continuity and security incident
response through risk-aware resource management. This novel approach aims at the efficient and
effective re-allocation of resources at the re-engineering stage in order to improve the planning and
evaluation of (business continuity and incident) response processes. The possibility to visualize the
workarounds, beside simulating them for improvement purposes, enables reuseability for simplified
emergency procedure flow charts in business continuity documents.
Through the approach presented in this thesis we want to achieve better senior management
commitment by showing the business case for implementing an adequate response. Furthermore,
we aim to raise a deeper understanding about the value of business continuity.
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Related Work
“ If you wish your merit to be known, acknowledge that of other people.
ORIENTAL PROVERB
Within this chapter we outline related research in our area in order to highlight how our research
efforts relate to other approaches and concepts. Furthermore, the following sections should provide
new readers a good overview of recent developments in the domain of business process security,
dynamic resource allocations with focus on business process and workflows and business process
resilience as well as business continuity.
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5.1 Approaches Integrating Risks and Security Aspects in
Business Process Management
This section provides information about related research in the domain of business process security.
The majority of the presented approaches in this section integrate or combine risk, business
continuity, security or dependability aspects with business process management aspects.
Sackmann identifies in his paper [94] the following challenges for traditional risk management
methods. The dynamic nature of IT implies a lack of experience regarding the relation between IT
risk and implications of changes. The relations between IT and business processes are often complex.
An occurring risk on one IT system can have effects on several business processes. [94, p. 3] In order
to face the challenge, the author introduces a layer-based IT risk reference model (Fig. 5.1 containing
the following layers [94, pp. 4-6]:
1. Business Process Layer (Layer 4 / BP Layer): In this layer it is important to model the business
processes that should be considered. The author emphasizes that for further analysis steps, it
is essential to determine the monetary contribution of a process to the company’s results.
2. IT applications / IT infrastructure layer (Layer 3 / AP Layer): Supporting IT applications as
well as their underlying infrastructure components are included in this layer.
3. Vulnerabilities layer (Layer 2 / VN Layer): This layer captures the vulnerabilities of IT
applications and their infrastructure components. This enables a bridging of IT threats to
business processes.
4. Threats layer: this layer contains information about all known threats. If possible, the
information about threats should include their probability of occurrence.
This reference model ”serves as foundation for formal modeling of the relations between causes
of IT risks and their effects on business processes or a company’s returns” [94]. For expressing these
relations (i.e. the searched cause-effect relations) a matrix-based description is used.
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Figure 5.1: IT Risk Reference Model [94]
In their work zur Muehlen and Rosemann highlight the strong connection between processes and
risk. On the one hand, risk management is a process, on the other hand risks have to be considered in
business processes for various reasons. The authors also stress that research in both domains is based
on different methodologies and is conducted by different groups with different focuses. [119, pp. 1-2]
According to the authors, besides a common understanding of business processes, two important
aspects have to be considered: Firstly, there exists a link between objectives and processes. Processes
can be refined into activities. As risks can be linked to activities too, risks can also be seen as
goal-sensitive. Secondly, a process is more than just a flow of activities. Thus, other risk-sources
such as incoming business objects, data, resources or IT are relevant for risk management activities.
They therefore, introduce in their paper a taxonomy for business processes containing the clusters
goals, structure, information technology, data and organization as well as the two distinguished
lifecycles build-time and run-time. Further a risk taxonomy (Fig. 5.2) is introduced which enables
consideration of process risks. [119, pp. 3-5]
In order to adequately capture the risks they propose the following four model types [119, pp.
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5-8]:
1. Risk Structure model: In this model a hierarchy of risks is represented. For modeling risks two
types of relations (i.e. part-of and is-a) are used.
2. Risk Goal model: This matrix-based model provides information about the impacts of risks on
the goal of an organization.
3. Risk State model: This model captures dynamic aspects of risk. The main modeling types of
the model are risk, consequence and connectors.
4. EPCs extended with risks: This model enables the analyst to link individual activities to
specific risks.
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Figure 5.2: Risk Taxonomy [119, p. 4]
In their paper [85], Neiger et al. stress the need for a holistic business view on risk management.
The authors therefore, introduce a conceptual framework to bridge the gap between process
management and risk management. The underlying foundations for this conceptual framework
build the risk oriented process management introduced by zur Muehlen and Rosemann [119] and
the concept of value-focused process engineering introduced by Neiger and Churilov [84]. Both
approaches use event-driven process chains as a basis. [85]
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The link between value-focused process engineering and risk management is established through the
consideration of risk treatment as a business objective. The four steps to enable a proper integration
are [85]:
Decomposition of business values and fundamental objectives in order to identify relevant
process risks.
Value focused principles are used in order to identify specific risks. An articulation of
links between activities and risk-related objectives takes place. The result is a link between
objectives and the process flow.
Identification of alternative process configurations that fulfill the business objectives
The alternative configurations and their corresponding outcomes are compared in order to
select the optimal process configuration (meeting the risk objectives)
[8] is a UML-based approach for conducting security risk analyses. Figure 5.3 outlines the
conceptual model of the CORAS approach. The methodological process supporting the CORAS
approach consists of the following seven steps:
1. Introductory meeting: This step focuses on determining the goals of the analysis and on
gathering information about the target.
2. High-level analysis: In a separate meeting, the analysis team presents their understanding of
the information provided in the initial step. Furthermore, a high level security analysis is
conducted in this step which comprises the identification of “... threats, vulnerabilities, threat
scenarios and unwanted incidents ...” [8, p. 101] The output of this step is used to improve
scoping and to ensure that the direction of the next analysis steps is appropriate.
3. Approval: Within this step the description of the target is refined. Further, assumptions and
predictions are captured. The steps ends with an approval of the information by the client.
4. Risk identification: In a workshop threats, vulnerabilities as well as unwanted incidents and
threat scenarios are identified by people with expertise on the evaluation target.
5. Risk estimation: In this step the information is refined by providing estimates about the
likelihood and consequences of unwanted incidents.
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6. Risk evaluation: A risk picture is presented in this step in order to trigger possible adjustments
and corrections.
7. Risk treatment: Through a workshop treatment and cost / benefit issues are identified.[8]
Figure 5.3: CORAS conceptual model [90]
Karagiannis et al. [69] introduce in their paper a business process based approach supporting
reporting requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) . The approach contains six steps and
is realized in the professional toolkit ADONIS R©. In order to enable their compliance extensions
(i.e. requirements demanded by SOX [88] and COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
of the Treadway Commission) [25]), the ADONIS R© standard modeling language has been extended .
The presented framework contains the following steps [69, pp. 318-320]:
Business Process Acquisition: The central element of the approach are business processes. For
this reason, the acquisition of business processes takes place in the initial step. The authors
highlight that it is important to provide detailed information in order to get good results.
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Risk Management and Scoping: In this step accounts significant to SOX are identified and
documented in a ’Significant Account Model’. Further, related risks are identified, documented
and modeled. For each risk the likelihood and impact is determined. Through the tool used for
this assessment, the impact of the risk situation is immediately shown by a traffic light coding.
This evaluation is the starting point for determining controls.
Design Effectiveness: This stage ”... deals with the revision of internal controls, intended to
balance risk and control costs ...” [69].
Operating Effectiveness: In this step controls are analyzed with respect to their effectiveness.
Depending on the results different remediation measures may be applied.
Internal Management Review: In this step it is evaluated whether the company is
SOX-compliant. The evaluation report is then signed-off by management.
Auditor’s Final Review: In the last step an external auditor who is independent receives the
financial reports and internal management review report.
The approach was evaluated in a case study with a US insurance company covering nearly 200
business processes. For more information we refer the reader to [69].
Sadiq et al. present [95] another approach to support business process compliance. In their
paper the authors highlight the need for systematic approaches to understand the interconnection and
dependency between business and control objectives. Accordingly, the authors present an approach
that enables the modeling of control objectives using the Formal Contract Language (FCL) which
was introduced in [44]. For visualization in the process models the authors use ’process annotations’.
A sample process (simplified purchase-to-pay scenario) clarifies how the approach can be applied to
existing processes.[95]
Sienou et al. present in their paper [97] a method for the integrated management of process
risk, including a lifecycle model, a metamodel, a modeling language and a set of usage rules.
Furthermore, the authors identified the following challenges originating from the different viewpoints
of risk and business experts: (1) Incompatibilities in the organization structure of risk management
and process management (2) Semantic incompatibilities of risk and process related information. In
order to overcome the before-mentioned challenges the authors propose the following approach: (1)
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Synchronization of process management and risk management lifecycles (2) Incorporation of risks
and processes in one holistic meta model (3) Operational developments of languages and rules.[97]
Rodriguez et al. [91] propose in their paper a UML 2.0-based approach to model security
requirements of business processes. The extended UML activity diagram serves business analysts to
specify their security requirements. In a second step security analysts complement the specification
of the business analysts. Figure 5.4 outlines the extended activity diagram meta-model.
Figure 5.4: Extended meta-model with security stereotypes [91]
Weber et al. [110] propose another approach to validate processes against compliance
requirements. The basis for their approach is a set of constraints. This constraint base enables
compliance check with regard to the following two scenarios: (1) checking new or altered processes
(2) checking all processes against altered compliance requirements.
Jallow et al. [65] propose a framework for risk analysis in business processes which mainly
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focuses on the identification and analysis phase. As a basis for their risk assessment dimensions the
authors use the criteria cost, time and performance/quality as proposed by Zhou and Chen [118].
The framework follows the six steps of Figure 5.5, i.e.:
1. Model the activities and risks of the business process: In the first step the activities of a process
are modeled. In the subsequent steps, risks are firstly evaluated on activity level and thereafter
analyzed on process-level.
2. Determine the objectives: As described above, three dimensions (i.e. cost, time and output)
are used for the evaluation of a process. For the analysis of an activity, the authors suggest
the same dimensions. As their current approach only allows one dimension at a time, the
evaluation objective should be determined in this phase.
3. Identify risk factors, probability of occurrence and impact: In this phase, risk identification
takes place. While identifying the risk, the probability of occurrence is determined as well.
4. Define assumptions (regarding the risk impact): In this step, assumptions are drawn about the
possible impacts of a risk. As the authors claim that it is difficult to determine a single value,
they decided to use a three point estimate (consisting of a low impact case, the most likely
case impact and the worst case impact) resulting in a triangular function to describe the risk
impacts.
5. Calculate risk: For each risk factor the risk output is determined by multiplying the occurrence
rate with the impact magnitude. ”The impact is not a discrete value but a series of values
generated by the simulation based on the distribution” [65].
6. Calculate forecast: The framework supports two types of forecasts. One for each activity and
a accumulative forecast for the whole process.
In order to test the framework, the authors implemented a prototype using Microsoft Excel and the
add-on software Crystal Ball
TM
.
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Figure 5.5: The risk-based proposed framework [65]
Breu et al. [9] present in their work a systematic IT risk assessment approach for enterprises and
projects. The basis is an enterprise model which either exists or has to be created. This enterprise
model is structured in the following three levels or views: (1) business level (2) application level
(3) technical level. The usage of the model facilitates the evaluation of dependencies between the
different layers. [9]
Regarding the security management process the authors extended typical security management
core actions (i.e. elicitation of security requirements, identification of threats, evaluation of risks and
countermeasures engineering) in two ways. Firstly, for the security analysis process, a meta-model
is introduced to perform all core actions in the context of enterprise model elements and secondly,
the core process is a security micro-process continuously performed on the enterprise model. Figure
5.6 outlines the activities of the security micro-process and figure 5.7 the security information
meta-model[9].
Figure 5.6: Security micro-process [9]
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Figure 5.7: Security information meta model [9]
AURUM is a framework for automated information security risk management [31, 39, 32, 40].
The authors identify the following questions which have to be considered by every organization[40]:
What are potential threats for my organization?
How probable are these threats?
Which vulnerabilities could be exploited by such threats?
Which controls are required to most effectively mitigate these vulnerabilities?
What is the potential impact of a particular threat?
What is the value of security investments?
In which security solutions is it worth investing?
Fenz et al. [40] focus on the development of concepts providing answers to the above-mentioned
questions. Furthermore, they pursue the objective to provide support for risk managers in order to
improve security decision making. The specification of the developed concepts introduces new risk
management approaches and techniques on a conceptual level and constitutes the basis for further
tool implementations. Fig. 5.8 highlights the supported ISRM-phases. The aim of the framework
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is to support decision makers in order to select security solutions in an efficient and effective way.
[31, 39, 32, 40]
The approach consists of the following phases: (1) Business Process Importance Determination,
(2) Inventory Phase, (3) Threat Probability Determination, (4) Risk Determination and (5) Control
Identification and Evaluation.
Figure 5.8: The AURUM process [40]
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Jensen et al. [66] present a novel approach to incorporate security specifications and model
driven software development. Therefore they introduce an EPC Security Model View which is
implemented as new perspective within the ARIS SOA architect.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the architecture proposed by the authors. An EPC model view is
supplemented by EPC Security Model View which is used for security requirements specification.
The specifications are used when generating the WS Security Policy and BPEL processes at a later
stage. At the moment of creation, the work was still in progress. Thus, the authors concentrated on
prioritized security properties such as access control, confidentiality and integrity.
The security model used to specify security requirements, consists of standard EPC notation and
the four security symbols: (1) message level encryption, (2) signature, (3) end-to-end encryption, (4)
access control. To ensure that no business requirements are negatively affected by the security view,
it is not allowed to change any EPC element out of the EPC security model view. EPC components
that need not be analyzed within the security perspective have a gray filling.
After all security requirements are modeled, the requirements can be realized by using a fully
automated transformation procedure described by the authors. According to the authors, the usage of
EPC is not compulsory as their concept is language-independent.
Figure 5.9: An example view principle for event-driven process chains in the ARIS SOA
Architect [66]
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5.2 Dynamic Resource Allocation within Risk Aware
Business Process Re-engineering
In the following paragraphs we briefly outline essential information about resource allocation and
scheduling.
Effective and efficient planning / scheduling of resources as well as considering tasks’
interdependencies are crucial for reacting on critical incidents. [22]
Aalst et al. also outline in [108] the importance of dynamic resource re-allocations: ´´The idea
of resource redeployment is to increase the capacity of the resources associated to cases or tasks that
are running late. Resource redeployment can take many forms including: adding more resources
(e.g., moving people between departments), extending the scope of the roles associated with a task
(e.g., allow people with a lower role to execute the task), increasing the capacity per resource (e.g.,
overtime) or changing the allocation of tasks to achieve load balancing.” For further escalation
mechanisms and resource allocation patterns such as task pre-dispatching or resource re-deployment,
we refer the reader to [93, 108, 92, 47].
The use case for scheduling algorithms and approaches is manifold. Whenever it comes
to considerations to optimize time and resource utilization scheduling plays an important role.
Examples where this discipline can provide valuable input comprise production scheduling for
manufacturers, course scheduling for schools/universities or time tables for transportation services.
“In the offline shop scheduling problems such as job-shop, flow-shop and open shop problem,
each job contains several steps (tasks) and all jobs are known before scheduling. So that, many
optimization algorithms such as Neural Network and Generic Algorithm can be applied to find out
an optimized scheduling plan. In the online non-shop scheduling, each job contains only one step
and jobs arrive over time. So that, rules based algorithms are employed, such as SRPT (Shortest
Remaining Processing Time) and SJF (Shortest Job First).” [109]
As within our risk aware business process management approach jobs, resources and even tasks
(e.g. activity allocation) can vary due to uncertainty originating from risks, we concentrate in the
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following on those rule based algorithms that currently provide the best results. However, as the
research domain of scheduling is a very active field, our conceptual model as well as the prototypical
implementation allow easy replacement of the algorithm used. For more detailed information on
scheduling algorithms we refer the interested reader to detailed evaluations of scheduling algorithms
such as [89]
The scheduling approach used within our evaluation example is based on the principle of
prioritization. The reason for this choice is simple: Incident response, recovery and continuity
procedures are normally strictly prioritized in order to enable an effective and efficient response in
the case of an emergency. [57, p. 16] One result of our literature review is that this can be best
achieved by this concept.
Another interesting aspect that is derived from the generalist - specialist problem is that we
assume that resources can replace other resources to full or partial extent. In the following we shortly
introduce the challenge and the way Netjes et al. solved the problem.
Netjes et al. [86] introduce an approach addressing the challenge of the specialist-generalist
trade-off and the flexible assignment policy. The specialist-generalist trade-off has the objective to
identify the optimal ratio between specialists which are capable to perform one task and generalists
which can perform more than one task.
Furthermore, it is assumed that specialists can do their task faster than generalists. The usage of
the flexible assignment policy should guarantee that the best possible flexibility is preserved for the
future. This implies that if two resources for a task are available (one specialist and one generalist),
the specialist will be assigned with a higher priority to carry out the task to maintain a better
flexibility. Within the scope of the paper, business processes consist of inter-related tasks. A task is
carried out by one resource. A task has the restriction that it can either be fully performed or not at
all. Resources have different roles to facilitate the mapping between resources and tasks.
For modeling and analyzing such a resource-constraint process, the authors use colored petri nets
(CPN). Within these CPNs tasks are connected to generic resource modules which contain the role
capable to fulfill the task. The allocation strategies that can be used by resource modules to assign
resources to tasks are priority-based or random. If the priority based allocation strategy is used,
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pre-defined priorities are used to allocate the resources. In the second case, resources are allocated
by randomly drawing a resource that is capable to perform a task out of the resource pool. In order to
illustrate the approach, the authors present a short sample bank process modeled in CPN using their
allocation approach.[86]
Korvin et al. present in their work [26] how tasks can be assigned to resource pools. A task can
have certain requirements and each pool provides resources with mixed capacities. The significance
of a resource for executing a specific task is determined via its membership. The membership value
is a number between 0 and 1, where zero indicates the lowest importance level (no use) and a one
indicates the highest importance or dependency. [26]
Xu et al. [116] pursue a similar direction. They analyze the usage of resources in order to
significantly reduce costs of the business process execution through a more efficient allocation of
required resources. Therefore, they introduce their concept of a role-based business process model
which defines resources, roles, tasks, business processes and their relations in order to enable an
appropriate determination of the most cost-effective resource allocation.
If neglecting the cost factor, Topcuoglu et. al[105] propose an earliest-finished-time algorithm to
optimize the processing time of processes.
Both pools (i.e. task pool, resource pool) are organized as finite fuzzy sets. In the case of a
resource pool, the membership attributes indicate the pool’s possibility to provide resources. For
example, a membership value of zero states that the pool is not able to provide the needed resource.
Korvin et al. derive a so called measure of compatibility between task and resource pools. This
compatibility is also organized as fuzzy set. The center of area method is used to enable a comparison
of the sets’ defuzzifications. Furthermore, an algorithm is described how to recursively assign
tasks to resource pools and to handle violations (i.e. no assignment possible). For decision making
purposes, the authors consider costs of using a pool and a flexible budget (the initial budget limit
may be exceeded to some extent if the need is accordingly large). To reflect importance issues, the
approach allows the weighing of compatibility and costs.[26]
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5.3 Business process resilience and business continuity
Zalewski et al. suggest in their work [117, pp. 113-125] business processes to model disaster
recovery plans. They highlight that the analysis with automatic tools has enormous advantages
compared to manual analysis. A further benefit of using a modified business process notation,
besides the graphical and uniform representation of information, resides in the possibility to check
the validity of the model. To model business continuity and disaster recovery plans the authors
suggest the following layers: Organizational View, Data View, Functional View, Product/Service
View and Process/Control View. The authors successfully used their model to analyze the DR plan
of the University of California. [117]
Boehmer et al. [7] present an approach to analyze business continuity plans using process algebra
and modal logic. Within the paper they clarify their approach with a simplified loan process. [7]
Khanmohammadi and Houmb present in their paper [72] an approach to evaluate information
security by using process-based information. The idea behind the approach is that assets only pose
value to an organization or individual if they are used within a process or task. In order to better
evaluate the state of risk, they separate processes into business process and control processes. Control
processes are all processes that protect business processes or assets such as encryption or access
control. [72]
Caralli et al. present in their paper [19] the CERT R© Resilience Management Model (RMM).
The model uses foundational concepts including services (set of activities), business processes
(set of discrete activities or tasks contributing to service mission), assets (everything of value for
a company) and resilience requirements. The RMM is further structured into 26 process areas
containing practices that facilitate improvement of resilience in the specific area. [19] Detailed
information about the resilience model can be found in [18], [20]
Dey [28] briefly outlines in his paper the importance of business continuity. Furthermore, he
outlines the essential components that are necessary to perform business continuity. For further
information on relevant professional guidelines and standards, we kindly refer to [42].
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5.4 Chapter Summary
In this section we gave an insight into existing concepts, methods and techniques in related research
areas of this thesis.
In the first section we introduced various approaches, which has achieved the following results:
Specification of security requirements
Reduction of the gap between business process management and risk management
Extended evaluation capabilities regarding business process availability and compliance
All mentioned approaches in section 5.1 made significant contributions in the field of business
process security. However, to our knowledge no approach exists so far that is able to incorporate risk
and security aspects into business process management and provides support for the planning and
evaluation of workarounds in order to improve the organization’s resilience.
In the second section we outlined various publications considering resource scheduling in
business processes. We presented various different approaches used in the research field of
scheduling. As in nearly all business continuity plans a comprehensive prioritization exists we
concentrated on scheduling by priority. However, as a requirement of this section the meta-model
presented in this thesis also incorporates the possibility to include other scheduling techniques.
In the last section of this chapter we provide a short overview on the topic business continuity
management and resilience which sets the background to the thesis. We highlighted approaches
which are currently trying to combine business processes and continuity efforts.
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Part II
The Methodology
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Risk-Aware Business Process
Management
“ Nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuvering for advantageous positions.
SUN-TZU
In this section, we present the main idea behind risk-aware business process management
[64, 102, 104, 60] in order to both provide the reader with an adequate overview and to clarify our
contribution in the following sections.
In our vision, risk-aware business process management can be ideally performed when building
appropriate bridges between business process management and the relevant security domains (e.g.,
risk or business continuity management). As the logical next step, risk-aware business process
modeling consequently enables adequate simulations. These two techniques are the cornerstones of
business process planning and reengineering where our current research focus lies.
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Figure 6.1: Conceptual Approach towards Risk-Aware Business Process Modeling and
Simulation
In a nutshell, in our conceptual approach (see Fig. 6.1) business process elements, such as
activities and resources, are endangered by threats. If a threat is successful, one of the possible
impacts may be the unavailability of a resource, leading to delays in the execution time of connected
activities. In order to represent the current security situation detection-, counter- and recovery
measures are modeled. If sufficient information is available, these measures are modeled as business
processes that require resources and are endangered by threats. Detection measures invoke counter-
and/or recovery measures. The quality of the measure affects the point in time when detection
or invoking respectively, takes place. Counter measures try to eliminate an occurred threat and
recovery measures try to re-establish the functionality of potentially affected business process
elements. Basically, detection measures are the first step and thus can influence counter and recovery
measures, whereas the efficiency and effectiveness of counter measures only influence following (or
overlapping) recovery measures. Fig. 6.1 shows the conceptual approach described above. In our
opinion, it is a real strength of our approach that results of typical projects, such as business process
analyses, risk assessments or business impact analyses, do not end up as dusty reports in cabinets but
can be modeled and subsequently used in a continuous manner or simulation purposes.
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Figure 6.2: Introduction of Risks into Business Process Management
Consequently, we further concentrate on our vision of building the bridge between business
process management and risk as well as contingency domains. To exemplify our vision, Fig. 6.2
schematically depicts core activities of the Business Continuity Management (BCM) Life Cycle (left
side) according to [10, 11] and core activities of the Business Process Modeling paradigm BPMS
(right side) according to [68]. Our bridging concept is sketched in Fig. 6.2.
Important steps and issues to integrate the above mentioned domains and concepts are:
1. The interconnection of business process modeling and simulation techniques together with
Simon Tjoa, 9708080 36
business impact analysis and risk assessment techniques enables the risk-aware business
process analysis.
2. Processes can be much better understood by not only focusing on economic factors, but
also by taking risks and business process activity disruptions into consideration. Financial
and reputational impacts of a process interruption, for example, should definitely be taken
into account when defining strategic guidelines, success factors and essential criteria (e.g.
availability requirements) for the business processes of a company.
3. This broadened view delivers added value when (re-) engineering and optimizing the business
processes. Subsequently, prospective business processes which have been designed under
consideration of economic, continuity and risk information will be available.
4. Consequently, this delivers added value for determining BCM options as the evaluations
of potential strategies (e.g. alternate data center) are tightly aligned to the available
business process information (e.g. product/service value, processes’ prioritization or
availability/recovery requirements).
5. Selecting the most appropriate option is the basis for developing and implementing the BCM
response. Accordingly, plans can be developed considering specific process characteristics
such as minimal resource requirements after an incident.
6. Risk-aware designed business processes and their related continuity plans build the foundation
for determining appropriate resources. This comprises not only resource utilization
considerations to perform the business process activities under normal conditions. When a
threat occurs, which endangers the activities’ execution, it will trigger the invocation of plans
that detail the steps to be taken during and after an incident (to maintain and restore operations).
7. This further leads to a sufficient integrated implementation of both, the business process
execution in the operation environment and the institution of the business continuity and
business recovery plans.
8. The aggregation and preparation of process information, extraction of performance indicators
and metrics serves as valuable input for iterations in the BCM life cycle.
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9. Lessons learned and metrics from plans’ rehearsal or even invoked plans trigger again the
start of a process to continuously improve the understanding of a company’s business and its
processes.
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6.1 Steps Required to Perform Risk-Aware Business
Process Management
This section outlines essential steps of the proposed approach in order to conduct risk aware business
process management. The steps are derived from several best practice documents, guidelines and
standards in business continuity, security and risk domains. However, although we aligned the
approach with existing frameworks/standards and recommendations, they should be understood
as a valuable toolbox (reflecting the state-of-the-art in this topic) and not as rigid or inflexible
requirements. As a complete and comprehensive BCM guide would go far beyond the scope of
this work, we refer to dedicated BC literature such as [29, 16, 10, 12, 34, 13] in order to get a
comprehensive view on all mentioned topics.
Figure 6.3 provides an overview on the different phases (Perform Program Management,
Determine AS-IS Situation, Re-Engineer Processes, Implement Process, Review and Evaluate) of
our conceptual approach.
Figure 6.3: Recommended Phases for Performing Risk-Aware Business Process
Management [62]
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6.1.1 Perform Program Management
The program management is responsible for ensuring that all projects and activities in the scope of
risk-aware business process management are carefully planned and controlled. This component is a
key function as inadequate program management most often results in additional costs, delays and a
decrease in quality.
We will now discuss key activities that should be carried out in order to provide good program
management for risk-aware business process management.
Scope Definition
The definition of the scope is crucial to ensure that the program meets its objectives. It is good
practice to clearly define and document the scope in order to ensure traceability. Typically, a scope
definition indicates which business units, functions and processes are subject to the program. Other
criteria, such as geographic scale or products, can also be used to define the scope.
When deciding on a scope, one should be aware of the fact that a too narrow scope definition can
lead to misleading results, as important parts of an organization could be out of scope. On the other
hand, a too widespread definition can waste considerable amounts of money.
In order to guarantee the adequacy and correctness, senior management should sign-off the scope.
As the environment of a company can change dynamically, the scope should be evaluated at least
annually.
Organizational Environment
Within this step, information is collected about the environment in which the company operates.
This includes information about customers, competitors, shareholders and other stakeholders.
Furthermore, it is important to clearly specify and analyze the vision, mission and business objectives
of a company in order to understand the strategy and tactical decisions.
The results of this key activity contribute to a clear understanding of the organization, which is
crucial for evaluating risks and countermeasures. Deficiencies in the understanding of the objectives
and strategies of an organization obviously will lead to inappropriate continuity measures.
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Risk and Continuity Evaluation Criteria
Only a goal that is correctly and comprehensively specified can be achieved. For this reason it is
important to introduce criteria in order to measure the outcome of a program. When defining these
criteria one should consider that the metrics are specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time
bound (SMART) as described by [76].
Examples of such measurable criteria would be a cost reduction by five percent in the next
quarter or a service availability of at least 99 percent in the next year.
Besides the above-mentioned evaluation criteria, consistent criteria for risk, safety and security
evaluation activities should be defined. These criteria should include at least:
which impacts (e.g. financial, brand, reputation, health, compliance to regulations and laws)
should be considered
which scales should be used for measuring impacts. Some examples can be found in [38, p.9]
which scales should be used to rate the criticality of services, resources or processes (e.g.
highly critical, critical, normal, low, negligible)
the approach to evaluate risks and business impacts (e.g. usage of a qualitative or quantitative
approach)
which residual risk is acceptable for the organization for which impact category
As in the previous steps, the best way to manifest all the important criteria is their formulation
in formal documents which have a reliable document control. This will enable the traceability of
decisions on countermeasures.
In order to plan workarounds and dynamic resource re-allocations, re-allocation criteria should
be determined. These criteria include information such as when resource allocations should take
place, to which extent resources should be re-allocated or what social and cultural aspects should be
considered concerning human resource allocations.
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Roles and Responsibilities
The set up of a successful program always requires a clear definition of roles and responsibilities.
For business continuity programs it is recommended to have at least a sponsor at senior management
level. As various assessments are required to obtain the desirable results appropriate resources should
be assigned to the program.
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that for an effective BC response it is inevitable to have
an adequate communication and escalation structure. Various standards and guides (e.g. [16, 12])
provide helpful information on this topic.
Program Steering
The program coordination team is usually responsible for monitoring and controlling the program
activities. This typically includes project management activities such as time and budget management,
resource management, quality management as well as program risk management.
6.1.2 Determine As-Is Situation
An evaluation of the current situation regarding security, risk and continuity is essential to plan
further steps. In order to support organizations, we recommend to perform the following steps.
Core (Business) Process Identification
The first step when using our approach is to determine the core business processes. As these
processes strongly contribute to the success of the organization and ensure the continuity of the
organization, information should be collected carefully. All business units within the scope should
be surveyed to guarantee that sufficient information about the core activities, execution paths and
dependencies is gathered.
The information about the business processes should be mapped to the organization’s goals.
Furthermore, details should be acquired about each process (activity) such as costs and execution
times as well as the contribution of the processes (e.g. monetary value, intermediate products). Apart
from that, internal and external dependencies and interdependencies should be documented.
Resource Identification
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Resources are required in order to perform all activities. Therefore, required resources, their
interdependencies and their assignment to activities are determined in this step. The skills,
knowledge, financial value and other resource properties such as geographic dispersion or
replacement costs have to be acquired in order to enable further analysis steps. Current metrics
and security for resources such as recovery time objectives or recovery point objectives have to be
gathered.
Furthermore, rules for resource allocation have to be created. These rules require the following
information: Firstly, one has to assign a resource map that outlines which resources can be
re-allocated or replaced by which resources and to what extent. Secondly, rules have to be provided
that indicate when a resource is re-allocated at the current situation (i.e. thresholds for certain
attributes).
Risk Identification
In order to cope with risks, it is important to deeply understand them. Therefore, in this step
techniques such as described in [56] are used to identify risks. The overall objective is to get a list of
risks the company is confronted with. Threat and hazard lists can constitute valuable input for this
task.
Using risk-aware business process management at least the following two types of risks should
be considered during risk identification [62]:
Business Risks affecting process characteristics (e.g. change of invocation frequency, input
parameters, change of decision probabilities). Business risks can be determined by historical
data such as nonpayment of credits per year or similar key figures.
Resource Risks affecting dependability attributes such as confidentiality, integrity and
availability (e.g. worm disrupting the functionality of servers). The analysis of the as-is
situation regarding resource related threats can be supported by tools used within the
organization, such as data leakage prevention solutions or event correlation tools. Furthermore,
risks can be identified by using external information such as the determination of environmental
vulnerability to natural disasters from meteorological institutes or information security trends
from research organizations.
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Detection, Counter and Recovery Measure Identification
This step delivers information about implemented countermeasures and safeguard processes. In
order to safeguard an organization, different tasks are required. Firstly, a threat has to be detected
in a timely manner to ensure a successful response. Examples of such detection measures are
fire detectors or other alarm systems. In our model it is possible to consider internal and external
mechanisms. Depending on the detection method, counter- and recovery measures may vary. In
order to clarify why this step is necessary, we want to give the following example. If a fire detector
that is coupled with a sprinkler detects a fire, the sprinkler will immediately try to extinguish the fire.
However, if a pedestrian detects a fire, he or she will likely call the fire brigade.
In our approach we categorize counter measures into two categories:
Preventive counter measures: A preventive counter measure is a measure that changes the
probability of occurrence of a threat (e.g. non-smoking policy)
Reactive counter measures: In contrast to a preventive measure, a reactive measure decreases
the potential impact by fighting a threat after it is detected (e.g. fire suppression system).
The last type of measures that should be identified within this step are recovery measures. These
measures recover resources and re-establish their functionality. An example of a recovery measure is
the restoration of data with back-up tapes.
The acquired information is represented according to the proposed model, which enables further
analyses such as risk-aware business process simulations as have also been introduced in our previous
work [64, 43, 102, 60, 104].
6.1.3 Reengineer Processes
This phase pursues the aim to simultaneously improve business processes considering security,
continuity and economic viewpoints. When identifying options, it should be mentioned that business
goals and requirements have to be the key driver. A security or continuity solution should always be
cost-effective (i.e. the benefit of the measure exceeds the costs/impacts).
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By establishing the link between counter measure and business process we strongly contribute to
more transparency. With this ability we are also capable of fulfilling the requirement [53, pp.46-47]
to track controls to business demands. Measures which cannot be traced back to a business need
should be further investigated, analyzed, and questioned.
In order to improve the continuity of the processes within an organization, at least the following
phases have to be performed.
Business Impact Analysis
The business impact analysis (BIA) is the key-component of every business continuity program. It
is a powerful tool to evaluate relevant dependencies (e.g. key supplier) and to analyze impacts over
time. The focus of the analysis lies on activities that are mission critical. Mission critical activities
are activities that are time-critical to the organization (i.e. a disruption of such an activity causes
critical damage in a short time span such as a few hours).
The business impact analysis examines the impacts (e.g. financial, reputational) of resources’
and/or activities’ disruptions over time. The outputs of a business impact analysis are key figures such
as the Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption (MTPD) or the Recovery Point Objective (RPO). [14]
In the course of this work, a metamodel is presented that can be used to capture the information
required to conduct a business impact analysis. As an additional advantage, valuable information can
be generated through simulations as described in [64, 43, 102, 60, 104].
Risk Analysis
The risk analysis evaluates identified risks regarding their occurrence probability and their impact
on resources and/or activities. Furthermore, interdependencies between risks (see [4]) as well as
the effects of existing and planned countermeasures should be analyzed. The outcome of this phase
is a list of threats that should be addressed as the residual risk is not acceptable (according to the
company’s risk strategy and criteria).
For detailed information about risk analysis, we refer the interested reader to dedicated risk
management literature ([21, 2, 4, 56, 55, 77])
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Identification of Improvement Options
The identification of areas for improvements is the key objective of this phase. An important
aspect within this step is that security improvements should always be evaluated from a security
and economic point of view. Another outcome of this activity is the prioritization of improvement
alternatives. For this task it is vital to have clear criteria how prioritization should take place.
The resource re-allocation approach described in this thesis offers a new opportunity to identify,
evaluate and assess various improvement options by demonstrating the effects of workarounds
through the simulation of dynamic re-allocation of resources (and activities).
The set of improvement options should be documented and presented to the senior management
for sign-off. This ensures that the implemented improvements comply with organization’s objectives
and strategies.
Redesign of Processes
Once the decision is taken, which opportunities for improvement should be realized, the redesign
activity starts. Within the redesigning processes, special attention should be drawn to existing best
practice process structures and key controls such as separation of duties. The usage of risk-aware
business process simulation can be used to thoroughly test business process designs at an early stage.
Evaluation
As widely known, planning and design errors become more and more expensive at later stages.
For this reason, in the evaluation step the process designs are evaluated against the pre-defined
criteria. Any deficiencies found in the evaluation lead to a new process iteration. This ensures
that expensive design errors are minimized. Furthermore, lessons learned should be documented to
ensure continuous improvement.
6.1.4 Implement Processes
This step is the main driver for introducing the new process designs. The restructuring and redesign
of processes is a challenging task. For this reason it is important to consider at least the following
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topics in order to successfully perform the changes. A successful implementation will pave the way
for effective and efficient processes.
Project Setup
Due to the obvious advantages, it is highly recommended that process changes are implemented
by individual projects. Through the set up of projects it is easier to have a good cost control. An
important point to note is that clear roles and responsibilities for the projects should be assigned.
Furthermore, clear cost and time constraints should be defined.
More information about project management activities such as project controlling, staffing or
risk management can be found at [50].
Implementation
In this phase it is important to analyze and evaluate several technical solutions supporting the design
of the new processes. A further critical success factor is the adequate communication of process
changes in order to improve acceptance. If necessary, awareness trainings should be performed to
improve the organizational security / continuity culture.
The implementation phase can last for a longer period of time depending on the approved
(budgeted) scope of the implementation projects. For projects with an estimated duration longer than
one year, it is recommended to introduce controls and intermediate milestones (e.g. every n months)
in order to facilitate project management and control. A project status evaluation should be carried
out at least once a year.
Evaluation
The continuous improvement of processes is a vital requirement for organizations in order to
be competitive and successful. Therefore, in this step deficiencies, identified in the stage, are
investigated, analyzed and documented. Depending on the significance of the problem a new iteration
(i.e. a project remediating the problem) is started.
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6.1.5 Review and Evaluate
Deming [27] highlights the particular importance of continuous improvement of products and
services. Feedback loops (as Shewhart cycle [27, p. 88] or helix [27, p. 181]) are an integral part to
improve the quality of any system.
Business continuity, risk management and business process management are strongly influenced
by dynamic factors. Therefore it is important to review and control the processes on a regular basis
in order to ensure that changes in risk situations, market environment and other significant aspects
are recognized in a timely manner. Testing of business continuity and security capabilities of an
organization is indispensable in order to guarantee an effective response to incidents.
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6.2 The Formal Model
This section outlines our novel formal model. The mathematical model presented in this section
provides the capability of modeling business process elements (such as activities and resources),
threats, safeguards, their dependencies and interdependencies as well as impacts. In our current
approach, we only consider the security attributes availability, confidentiality and integrity. However,
the formal model can be easily extended to consider further attributes such as dependability attributes
proposed by Avizienis et al. [5].
6.2.1 A Formal Description of Business Process Elements
We define business process elements as those components that are necessary to describe a business
process and its dependencies as well as interdependencies within our model. Within our model
P := {process1, . . . , processk} represents the set of all possible business processes within an
organization.
Each process can further be broken down into more granular components such as activities and
resources. In our model, we therefore introduce Act = {Act1, . . . , Actl} as the set of activities and
R = {R1, . . . , Rn} as the set of resources.
In our formal model, we further define the following assumptions: Each activity Acti possesses,
one exact set of assigned resourcesAsRi and one activity assemblyAs(Acti) (assumption 6.1). Each
process (processj) is structured in a similar way. This means, for each process AsActj (assumption
6.2) one exact set of assigned activities exists.
∀Acti, i = 1, . . . l : ∃!AsRi ∧ ∃!As(Acti) (6.1)
∀processj , j = 1, . . . k : ∃!AsActj (6.2)
In order to characterize the business process elements presented above we introduce the set of
attributes A = {A1, . . . , Am}. Therefore, all processes, activities and resources have their own set of
attributes out of set A .
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The resources required to perform an activity are expressed by RRi, where the index i represents
the corresponding activity. Within RRi, information is provided which attributes of a certain
resource are required to execute an activity. In order to clarify our idea Fig.6.1 graphically outlines
this condition.
Formally described, tuples of the formRRi := {Acti; {(Rj , Am, Zj , fj,m(t)), . . . |Rj ∈ AsRi}}
can be used, where Acti is the specific activity, Rj represents a resource, Am its required attribute
and Zj the threshold indicating the minimum level of an attribute (e.g. availability = 100%) that is
required to perform an activity. If the attribute falls below Zj (e.g., threat impact) and no redundant
resources are available, then the corresponding activity is impacted. The function fj,m(t) describes
how the alteration of the resource’s attribute condition changes the activities’ condition itself.
Through the usage of logical operators (∨/∧), a resource tree (including the capability to represent
redundancies of resources) can be created for each activity. This tree is similar to a fault tree. More
information about fault tree analysis (FTA) can be found at [35, 56]
To clarify our mathematical approach we provide a short sample: We assume that there exists
an activity Act2. The set of attributes of this activity comprises two attributes. The first attribute A1
represents the availability and the second attribute A2 the integrity of the BPE. In order to perform
this activity correctly, a resource R1 “Server” (availability 80%, integrity 100%), a resource client
PC R2 (availability 100%) and, as can be seen in the figure, one of the two employees R3, R4
(availability 80%) are required. Using our formal model, this situation can be described as follows:
RR2 = {Act2; (R1, A1, 0.8, f1,1(t), A2, 1.0, f1,2(t)) ∧ (R2, A1, 1.0, f2,1(t))∧
[(R3, A1, 0.8, f3,1(t)) ∨ (R4, A1, 0.8, f4,1(t))]}
(6.3)
It is obvious that an alteration of a resource attribute’s condition has an indirect influence on the
corresponding activity itself. The impact of a threat on the attacked resource’s attribute is defined
in the threat’s impact function itself (ω(t)). In order to establish the link between the impact on the
resource and the activity, we use function fj,m(t) which is independent of ω(t) but dependent on the
resource’s condition.
In the following subsection we provide further details on the formal description of threats,
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safeguards and their impacts.
6.2.2 A Formal Description of the Behavior and Effects of Threats and
Safeguards
The formal representation of threats, their behavior and safeguards is a major prerequisite for our
risk-aware simulations. Therefore, in this section we outline how threats and safeguards are formally
described in our model in order to bridge the gap between business process management and
security/risk management.
As our declared focus and central element is business process management, we decided that
threats always affect attributes of business process elements such as the availability of a server or the
execution time of a task.
The characteristics of a threat are dynamic in nature. Therefore, we decided to formally describe
a threat through an impact function ω(t) which captures the characteristics of a threat such as
behavior or speed.
We define T = {T1, . . . , Tn} as the set of all possible threats. Each threat Ti has the following
parameters, which express impact of a threat on a business process element:
pn indicates the probability of occurrence in
a given time interval [t0; t1],
the impact function ωn(t) and
the corresponding attribute An
To clarify the above-mentioned description, we provide the following simplified example: Let
us assume a threat T1 (e.g., malicious code) which has a negative effect on the attribute A4 (e.g.,
availability or integrity), a rate of occurrence of p1 (e.g., 70%) within the time interval 2 and 5.5 and
the following impact function ω1(t) (e.g. linear function or Weibull function). Then we can express
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this threat by the following equation:
[T1; 0.7; [2, 5.5];ω1(t);A4]. (6.4)
Threats can be prevented and mitigated by countermeasures (also commonly referred to as
safeguards or controls). In our approach, countermeasures are grouped into three different categories
(i.e. preventive, blocking and reactive measures) according to their behavior. The characteristics and
distinguishing features of these categories are presented in the following paragraphs.
Preventive measures: This type of safeguards has a direct effect on a threat’s occurrence
probability. Examples of preventive measures against a fire-threat are the usage of
fire-resistant materials in offices or the introduction of a non-smoking policy in a company.
PA = {PA1, . . . , PAm} is the set of all preventive measures. A specific preventive measure can be
formally expressed by the following set of tuples:
PAm := {(Tk, ρk), . . .} (6.5)
where Tk describes the corresponding threat and ρk the associated probability reduction. Thus,
the probability of a threat pn is reduced by ρn leading to the new occurrence probability p˜n = pn−ρn.
Blocking measures: Blocking measures are a special case of reactive measures. The specialty
of this type of safeguard is that it immediately eliminates a threat upon its detection. Thus, threats
eliminated by blocking measures will lead to no further consequences for business processes. A good
example of a blocking measure is the filtering of emails. If the live-scan at an anti-virus scan center
determines a dangerous mail, it immediately deletes or quarantines the mail.
In our model we define BA = {BA1, . . . , BAl} as the set of blocking actions. Each blocking
measure BAl can be expressed as the following set of tuples:
BAl := {(Tk, βk), . . .} (6.6)
where Tk is the threat and βk indicates the detection probability of the threat.
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It is important to differentiate between the two probabilities p˜n and βk. p˜n describes the
occurrence probability of a threat while the probability βk decides whether a threat is detected and
immediately destroyed.
Reactive measures: A reactive measure can be defined as a safeguard that counteracts threats
during an attack. An example of reactive measures is the manual removal of a malicious code .
In our model, reactive measures are composed of the succeeding three parts: (a) detection
measures, (b) counter measures, and (c) recovery measures. The corresponding course of action
is as follows: An active threat is the prerequisite for successful detection. According to the point
of time of the detection respectively the threats behavior, an adequate counter measure (if existent)
is invoked. The detection measure decides which counter measure will be invoked. The following
example should highlight the reason behind this choice. Let us assume a fire-threat. If the fire is
detected by a fire-detector, and a fire suppression system exists, the fire suppression system will be
invoked. If the detection takes place by a pedestrian walking near the building, it is likely that the
fire-brigade will be called in the first run.
Similar to detection, we assume that the recovery process is launched by the counter
measure process. A slight difference between the relation of detection and countermeasure and
countermeasure and recovery measure is that countermeasures and recovery measures can overlap.
In other words, the countermeasure directly starts if detection is over, the recovery can start while the
countermeasure is still active.
In a simplified manner the phases can be summarized as follows: Detection→ Counter Measures
→ Recovery.
Furthermore, we make the following assumptions: The detection measure does not influence the
threat itself in any way. The detection is active in every time step and the predefined detection period
starts as soon as there is a recognizable change in the attribute’s condition function.
We define a detection measure as:
Simon Tjoa, 9708080 53
DMk := {Tj , Ai, dmk(t), (CMm, . . .)} (6.7)
where Tj represents the threat, which can be detected by a specific detection measure DMk. Ai
represents the corresponding attribute and dmk(t) is the function that provides information about
the probability of detecting the threat Tj at a given "attribute’s condition". The counter measures are
expressed by CMm, which can be a multidimensional vector. The usage of the function dmk enables
us to define a threat that has to be detected once the damage is x%. An example would be a burning
house. It is very unlikely that nobody recognizes that the house is exposed to fire-threat when half of
the house is already destroyed.
The counter measures have a direct influence on a threat’s state and therefore affect the impact
function ωn(t) of the corresponding threat Tn.
A specific counter measure CMm is expressed as:
CMm := {cmm(t), (RMn, . . .), (tcn, . . .)} (6.8)
where cmm(t) is the function describing the influence on the threat’s impact function, RMn are
the required recovery measures and tcn is the threshold holding information about the starting point
of the recovery.
The influence on the threat’s impact can be expressed by the new impact function:
ω˜n(t) := ωn(t) · (1− cmm(t)) (6.9)
In order to determine the starting point tr of the recovery measure RMn, we set up the following
assumptions:
1. ω˜n(tr) = tcn
2. ω˜′n(tk) ≤ 0
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The counter measure is stopped once ω˜n(t) = 0.
The recovery measure has a direct influence on the attribute’s condition function zi(t). It is
further specified through a recovery function rmi(t) . The influence on the condition of an attribute
can be seen as a new condition function:
z˜i(t) := zi(t) + rmi(t) (6.10)
The recovery ends once the condition is z˜i(t) = 1.
In order to clarify our formal model we demonstrate in the following how our approach can be
applied to model an activity’s attributes "availability" and "integrity".
6.2.3 Modeling the Activity’s Attribute Availability
For simulation purposes we assume that an activity possesses an attribute "degree of completion"
G : R→ [0, 1] (continuous). Further, the activity is considered completed once G = 1.
Finite activities have the following characteristics:
∃ t˜ ∈ R with G(t˜) = 1 (6.11)
∃ g, integrable, with G(t) =
∫ t
0
g(u)du (6.12)
For this reason, the execution time of a process activity can be derived by solving the following
integral equation:
G(t˜) =
∫ t˜
0
g(u)du (6.13)
In order to determine the impact of a threat attacking the availability attribute of an activity,
function (6.13) has to be extended with the threat’s impact function ω(t):
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G(t˜) =
∫ t˜
0
g(u)− ω(u)du (6.14)
6.2.4 Modeling the Activity’s Attribute Integrity
Some activities require the attribute "integrity". The measurement of a loss of integrity is similar as
described in the previous subsection 6.2.3. We assume the integrity of a certain activity to be a real
function i : R→ [0, 1]. As long as no threat is active, we set i(t) = 1.
The loss of integrity can be formally described as follows:
IL(t) =
∫ t
t0
(1− i(u))du (6.15)
While no threat endangers the integrity attribute, the "loss of integrity" is constantly equal to 0,
IL(t) = 0. In order to consider the impact of a threat on the activities’ integrity attribute, we extend
the function (6.15) with the threat’s impact function ω(u):
IL(t) =
∫ t
t0
(1− (i(u)− ω(u)))du (6.16)
with ω(u) being the impact of a threat on the integrity attribute and t0 being the starting time of
the activity. The enhanced function makes it possible to measure the resulting loss of integrity.
6.2.5 Relation between Resources’ and Activities’ Attributes
Activities depend on the functionality of their resources. Thus, impacts can have an indirect
influence on the corresponding activity’s attribute. In our model, we assume that this interrelation
is proportional to the difference emerging from the actual resource’s attribute condition and the
needed attribute condition. The needed state of an attribute ν can be obtained from the corresponding
resource requirements (see section 6.2.1, equation (6.3)).
Let Ntm be the current condition of a resource’s attribute Ai(t) at the point in time tm,
0 < Ntm < 1. If the condition Ntm reaches the threshold ν, then the condition’s alteration has
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an influence on the linked activity’s attribute. To realize this, we define the following support function:
ϕ(t) = f(ν −Nt) (6.17)
f(0) = 0 (6.18)
The support function ϕ(t) can be understood as function of threat impact on the activity’s
attribute, which depends only on the resource’s condition and is independent of the original threat’s
impact function.
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Figure 6.4: Influence of a Threat and its Consequences on the Availability Condition
Function. In Ascending Order: Impact Function, Resource Attribute Condition and Activity
Attribute Condition
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Fig. 6.4 illustrates the influence of a threat impact on the linked resource’s availability condition.
Additionally, it shows that an attacked resource’s availability has an indirect influence on the activity’s
completion function. The lower chart depicts the threat’s impact over time, while the middle chart
shows the according impact of the threat on the availability of the affected resource over time.
The upper chart shows the resulting impact on the continuous completion function of the assigned
activity (leading to an increase in the execution time). In this section, we outlined how relations
between activity attributes and resource attributes can be described using the example of the attribute
"availability". This example applies analogously to all similar cases (e.g., integrity attribute).
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6.3 Formal Description of Resource Re-Allocation
Elements
In this section we introduce our concept of resource re-allocations. A resource allocation can be
generally seen as a workaround or a way to improve the utilization of a resource. In our approach,
the trigger for re-allocations are changes in the process-, activity- or resource attribute’s condition.
We define three archetype sets for resources, activities and processes. Each set contains one or more
indicators and one or more subsets of possible resources for a successful allocation.
RAl(Ri) := {(Aj ,≤ / ≥Wi,j , [tn, tm]︸ ︷︷ ︸
indicator sequence
, PRi,j), . . .} (6.19)
RAl(Actk) := {(Al,≤ / ≥ Vk,l, [tn, tm]︸ ︷︷ ︸
indicator sequence
,
⋃
i,j
PRi,j : ∀Ri ∈ AsRk), . . .} (6.20)
RAl(processg) := {(Ah,≤ / ≥ Ug,h, [tn, tm]︸ ︷︷ ︸
indicator sequence
), . . .} (6.21)
where in equation (6.19) Ri ∈ R is the certain resource, Aj one of its attributes. Wi,j is the
threshold for the attribute’s Aj condition (z(Aj)) which is directly obtained from the corresponding
resource requirements RRn. Therefore Wi,j =̂ Zk, where Zk is the threshold from resource Ri
and attribute Aj from the corresponding RRn|Ri∈AsRn . The relational operators ≤ / ≥ determine
if the threshold has to be undershot / overshot for a successful impact of a threat. [tn, tm] is the
time interval in which the threshold is valid. PRi,j is a set of possible resources that are able to
successfully proceed the original resource’s (Ri) task. The elements of PRi,j are tuples of the
form: (Rm, pm), where Rm is the resource that could replace the original resource and pm the
corresponding percentage to which the resource’s attribute is needed for the specific activity. It is
possible to combine two or more such tuples with the logical operator ∧.
In equation (6.20), Actk is the specific activity, Al one of its attributes, Vk,l the threshold for
the attribute’s condition as described above. To get all possible allocation resources for an activity,
we unite every PRi,j of the activity’s resources. In equation (6.21), processg is a certain process,
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Ah one of its attributes, Ug,h the threshold for the attribute’s condition. We assume that an affected
process has to have an affected activity as well. Therefore it has only the indicator sequence and no
set of possible resources for each attribute.
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6.4 Formal Description of Activity Re-Allocation Elements
In order to diminish the impacts of an incident, it is sometimes necessary to substitute an affected
activity for another activity or a subprocess. Therefore, although it is not the main focus of this
thesis, we briefly want to discuss the concept of activity re-allocation in this section. The approach is
strongly aligned to our resource re-allocation concept.
In the following, we briefly provide an example to clarify the need for activity re-allocations:
Let us assume an activity that is heavily supported by information systems, such as the automated
control of a SCADA system. If the information system has a malfunction or is not available it might
be necessary to manually control the system. This could be represented by an activity re-allocation.
As mentioned above, the approach is based on the concept of resource re-allocations in the
previous sections. Therefore, the indicator sequence is built in the same way as in the formulas
(6.19)(6.20)(6.21). The difference to resource allocation is that the set of possible substitutes PAlk,l
contains activities and/or subprocesses instead of resources.
AAl(Actk) := {(Al,≤ / ≥ Zk,l, [tn, tm]︸ ︷︷ ︸
indicator sequence
, PAlk,l), . . .} (6.22)
with PAlk,l := {pal1, . . . , paln}, n ∈ N
and pal :=
 Actk ∈ Actprocessl ∈ P
AAl(processg) := {(Ah,≤ / ≥ Kg,h, [tn, tm]︸ ︷︷ ︸
indicator sequence
,
⋃
k,l
PAlk,l : ∀Actk ∈ AsActg), . . .} (6.23)
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6.5 Sample Scenario
In this section we present a simplified sample scenario. This scenario pursues the aim to outline
how our formal model can be applied. We deliberately decided on an simplified scenario where
the complexity level is manageable. However, the approach is also capable to manage complex
structures and scenarios if required.
The sample process (telephone support service) is performed in a call center of a fictive company
called ACME. The process follows a frequently used multi-level structure: The first level (Activity
1) support is responsible for initially answering all incoming calls. If the first level support can not
resolve the request of the customer, the call will be forwarded to the next stage (second level support
or Activity 2). Similar to the first level support activity, requests that cannot be remediated by the
second level support are escalated to third level support (Activity 3).
In order to initially plan the resources and demonstrate the capability of resource re-allocations
we introduce the following assumptions: Historical data of the organization provide the information
that under normal conditions, approximately 2/3 of the calls can be handled by the first level support
and only 1/3 of the calls are forwarded to the next level. Further, the second level support can directly
resolve half of the forwarded issues.
The prerequisite for the execution of Activity 1 is a person with skill level A. In our case, three
persons (with the corresponding skill level A) are assigned to Activity 1. For the higher support
levels, we assume that a skill level of B is required for second level support and skill level of C is
required to perform tasks in the third level support.
Due to cross-skill trainings in the company, we further assume that employees with skill level B
can replace employees with skill level A and persons with skill level C are able to act as deputy for
persons with skill level B.
For reasons of clarity, we schematically outlined the whole scenario in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: Decision Component
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6.6 Formal Description of the Sample Scenario
In this section, we present a simplified sample scenario to clarify our approach. The sample scenario
is schematically outlined in Section 6.5. The scenario can be described as follows with our formal
model:
(A1 =̂ availability, A2 =̂ backlog, A3 =̂ proceeds)
AsR1 := {R1, R2, R3}
AsR2 := {R4, R5}
AsR3 := {R6, R7}
AsAct1 := {Act1, Act2, Act3}
RR1 := {Act1; {(R1, A1, 70%, f1,1(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
q1
, . . .
(R2, A1, 70%, f2,1(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2
, (R3, A1, 70%, f3,1(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
q3
}}
RR2 := {Act2; {(R4, A1, 80%, f4,1(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
q4
, . . .
(R5, A1, 80%, f5,1(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
q5
}}
RR3 := {Act3; {(R6, A1, 80%, f6,1(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
q6
, . . .
(R7, A1, 80%, f7,1(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
q7
}}
As(Act1) := q1 ∨ q2 ∨ q3
As(Act2) := q4 ∨ q5
As(Act3) := q6 ∨ q7
RAl(R1) := {(A1,≤,
=70%︷ ︸︸ ︷
W1,1, [t0, tend], PR1,1)}
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PR1,1 := {(R4, 100%), (R5, 100%)}
RAl(R2) := {(A1,≤, 70%, [t0, tend], PR2,1)}
PR2,1 := {(R4, 100%), (R5, 100%)}
...
RAl(R5) := {(A1,≤,
=80%︷ ︸︸ ︷
W5,1, [t0, tend], PR5,1)}
PR2,1 := {(R6, 100%), (75, 100%)}
...
RAl(R7) := {(A1,≤, 80%, [t0, tend], ∅)}
RAl(Act1) := {(A2,≥, V1,2︸︷︷︸
=5
, [t0, tend], PR1,1 ∪ PR2,1 ∪ PR3,1)}
...
RAl(Act3) := {(A2,≥,
=2︷︸︸︷
V3,2, [t0, tend], PR6,1 ∪ PR7,1)}
RAl(process1) := {(A3,≥, U1,1︸︷︷︸
50
, [t0, tend])}
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6.7 Chapter Summary
In this section, we first introduced our general approach for risk aware business process management.
We highlighted how we intend to diminish the gap between business process management and
security-related respectively business continuity related approaches. In the further course of this
chapter, we presented the steps which were necessary to conduct sustainable risk-aware business
process management. After presenting the conceptual model and the methodological approach we
outlined our formal model.
In this formal model, we showed how our approach extends typical business process elements.
We further outlined our threat model and its essential parts in order to represent the behavior of
incidents (i.e. interaction between threat and safeguard aspects) and to determine the impact on
business processes.
Thereafter, we presented our re-allocation approach. In a nutshell the objective of formally
expressing re-allocations of activities and processes is to model workarounds. The mathematical
description serves as a basis for the Simulink prototype which is presented in the next chapter.
In Section 6.5 of this chapter, we provided a sample scenario in order to illustrate our approach
and its applicability for resource re-allocations.
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The Prototype
“ The superior man is modest in his speech, but exceeds in his actions.
CONFUCIUS
In order to test and evaluate our approach and formal model we used a prototype implemented in
Simulink R©. The reasons behind our decision to implement our proof-of-concept in Simulink R© were
the flexibility and built-in simulation support.
In the following sections, we further clarify the implementation of our formal model enabling
resource allocation and demonstrate how we simulate resource allocation using Simulink R©.
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7.1 Re-Allocation Algorithm
In this section, we outline our currently used re-allocation algorithm. Figure 6.5 demonstrates
how our resource (/activity) re-allocation decision component works. In every simulation step,
the attribute information of processes, activities and resources is evaluated against the previously
introduced re-allocation rules.
If the condition of a rule is true (e.g. attribute below a certain threshold) and the re-allocation is
possible, the re-allocation will be performed. The modular design of the resource allocation block
creates the possibility to easily change the allocation algorithm.
Previously, we declared the necessary sets and indicators for a resource re-allocation in the
context of business process management. To understand how we use those sets of possible resources
and indicators, we present the algorithm that was implemented in the toolkit Simulink R©:
Table 7.1: Pseudo Code: Resource Re-Allocation Algorithm
For each process attribute (∀Ah ∈ RAl(processg))
If indicator sequence is true
(z(Ah) ≤ / ≥ Ug,h in interval [tn, tm])
For each process activity attribute
(∀Al ∈ RAl(Actk)|Actk ∈ AsActg)
If indicator sequence is true
(z(Al) ≤ / ≥ Vk,l in interval [tn, tm])
For each process activity resource attribute
(∀Aj ∈ RAl(Ri)|Ri ∈ AsRk)
If indicator sequence is true
(z(Aj) ≤ / ≥Wi,j in interval [tn, tm])
Choose a resource from the
set of possible resources for Ri
(Ri ∈ PRi,j)
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Else
Choose a resource from the
set of possible resources for Actk
(Ri ∈ ⋃i,j PRi,j)
Assign resource Ri to activity Actk
As mentioned before in some cases a sole resource re-allocation is insufficient to reduce the
negative effects of a threat on a process or activity. Therefore we also introduced the possibility of an
activity allocation which works in an analogous way:
Table 7.2: Pseudo Code: Activity Re-Allocation Algorithm
For each process attribute (∀Ah ∈ AAl(processg))
If indicator sequence is true
(z(Ah) ∧ / ∨Kg,h in interval [tn, tm])
For each process activity attribute
(∀Al ∈ AAl(Actk)|Actk ∈ AsActg)
If indicator sequence is true
(z(Al) ≤ / ≥ Zk,l in interval [tn, tm])
Choose a subprocess from the
set of possible substitutes for Actk
(paln ∈ PAlk,l)
Else
Choose a subprocess from the
set of possible substitutes for processg
(paln ∈ ⋃k,l PAlk,l)
Assign subprocess paln to process processg
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7.2 Simulink Proof-of-Concept-Prototype
This section describes how our proof-of-concept-prototype is implemented. We used the sample
scenario presented in Section 6.5.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the main layer of our Simulink R© implementation. It represents one business
process and the corresponding business process elements.
The process consists of three activities which are represented by the subsystems Activity 1,
Activity 2, Activity 3. In order to model the flow (i.e. escalation to second level support or third
level support), two decisions Decision1, Decision2 are introduced. Further, each activity requires
resources which are represented by resource management subsystems RM1, RM2, RM3 and one
server resource block for all activities (Servers). Within the resource management subsystem we
realized the assigned PCs. Figure 7.2 illustrates how we implemented the resource management
subsystems.
Figure 7.1: Simulation Model: Main Layer
Additionally in the main layer, we find the allocation subsystem (Allocation) which will be
described later on in this section.
For the illustration of our process, we assume one financial attribute which is proceeds. Further
we assume that our activities have two attributes which are degree of completion (DC) and integrity
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loss (IL). The degree of completion attribute depends on the availability attribute of the needed
resources whereas the integrity loss attribute depends on the corresponding resources integrity
attribute. As our sample case should only deliver a demonstrative example, we consider the integrity
attribute only for the server.
Figure 7.2: Resource Management Subsystem of Activity 1
Figure 7.3: Simulation Model: Activity Layer
Figure 7.3 highlights the structure of an activity layer. The activity subsystem has the following
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input signals:
the assured resources (RG_AV, RG_IN)
the degree of completion and integrity loss attribute (DC_old, IL_old) of the previous time step
the help signal time_unit which is used to determine the length of the actual time step. This is
necessary to determine the integration intervals.
the initialize signal from the Queue block. This Boolean signal regulates when an activity (or
one of its instances) is started.
the input signal active_old captures information on the state of the activity in the previous time
step (i.e. if the activity was active or not)
The main component of the subsystem is an Embedded MATLAB Function which simulates
the activity. Firstly, the difference between required and assured ((RG_AV, RG_IN)) resources is
determined in order to get the actual completion speed and the integrity mismatch, respectively. The
next step is the calculation of the degree of completion and integrity loss attribute. Finally, it is
determined if an instance finished its execution and how many instances are active. The input signal
active_old gets updated at every time step and acts as the output signal ACTIVE which is required by
the Queue block. The backlog reduce signal BL_REDUCE indicates if an instance has finished a task
in the actual time step.
The Queue block on the left handles the incoming calls. It contains the input signals Call,
finished and active. The block calculates the value of the queue length (queue length) for the
corresponding activity and the initialize indicator (Calls) for the main block Embedded MATLAB
function. Whenever an incoming call appears (Call=1), the length of the queue is increased by 1.
Whenever an instance finishes a task (finished=1), the queue is decreased by 1. The active signal
gives information about the amount of active or nonactive instances, to decide whether a call gets
forwarded to the Embedded MATLAB Function block.
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Figure 7.4: Simulation Model: Allocation Layer
Figure 7.4 depicts the allocation layer. It is a subsystem of the main layer. It has one main block
realized as an embedded Matlab function (Resource Reallocation). This block has the following
input signals:
single_Attributes: represents the backlog of the activities BL_Act_1, BL_Act_2, BL_Act_3.
The sum of these values is used to calculate the aggregated backlog.
PCs_in: this signal contains information about the availability attribute of the PCs.
Allocate_old: this Boolean signal provides information about previous re-allocations.
Allocation_old: whenever a re-allocation takes place, the signal is set true.
Allocate_true: help signal to activate/de-activate re-allocation.
On the basis of our formal model and the above described input signals, the embedded Matlab
function determines if and how an allocation is needed. It has the output signals Allocate which is the
update signal of allocation_old. PCs is the actual permutation of the PCs.
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7.3 Results and Discussion
This section discusses the results gained by our simulation of the sample scenario. We compare two
different settings: (1) no re-allocation considered; (2) resource allocation available.
In the first scenario (Figure 7.5), the threat attacks an instance of activity 1 close to time step
400. Thus, the instance cannot proceed its intended task. The result of this inability to perform the
activity is an immense increase of the backlog of activity 1(c).
The remaining instances are not able to compensate the outage or to reduce the backlog.
Therefore, the backlog steadily increases until the recovery of the attacked instance. In our scenario,
approximately around time step 980 the instance works normal again. It is apparent that the instance
is in an operational state before (approximately at time step 730), but in an inefficient way. The
obvious lesser completion rate of activity 1 results in an almost stagnancy of the financial attribute
proceeds of the process. As no threat affects the execution of activities 2 and 3, there is no increase
of their backlogs.
Figure 7.5: Scenario: No Resource Allocation
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In the second scenario (Figure 7.6), one can see the simulation results for a business process
with enabled resource re-allocation. In subplot (a), the financial attribute proceeds (process level) is
depicted. The subplots (b), (d) and (f) show the degree of completion of the activity instances.
Activity 1 (b) has three instances, activity 2 and 3 (d)(f) have two instances. The subplots (c),(e)
and (g) highlight the corresponding backlogs for each activity. For the sake of readability, we chose
to limit the display area to the relevant time frame of the simulation (i.e. from time step 400 to 1100).
As in the previous scenario, we simulated a threat that attacks an instance of activity 1 (b) time
step 400. This attack results in the idleness of its degree of completion. Therefore the backlog of
activity 1 (c) increases like in the before-mentioned scenario. As soon as the caused backlog reaches
our pre-defined threshold (=5), a resource from activity 2 (d) gets re-allocated to activity 1. This
happens at time step 510.
The resource remains at activity 1 until it gets called back to its assigned activity due to the
increase of activity 2’s backlog (e) to the defined threshold. After the backlog of activity 2 is reduced
to an acceptable level, the same instance is re-allocated again to activity 1. As it is not possible for a
single instance of activity 2 to decrease the backlog appropriately, an instance from activity 3 (f) gets
allocated to activity 2 around time step 750. This results in an increase of activity 3’s backlog (g)
and in a decrease of activity 2’s backlog. The original instance of activity 1 is fully recovered around
time step 980. The allocated resources are transferred back to their original assigned activities in
order to reduce the emerged backlogs.
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Figure 7.6: Scenario: Resource Allocation
When comparing the presented scenarios, we can observe that in the second scenario the impact
on the process attribute proceeds is very low due to the effective and efficient resource allocation.
Contrary to what we have observed in the second scenario, one can see in the first scenario that the
threat on activity 1 results in major impacts on the process attribute proceeds as there is a major
downtime in the completion rate of activity 1.
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7.4 Chapter Summary
Based on the results of the previous chapters, we introduced the Simulink-prototype which was
used to test our formal approach on dynamic resource allocations. At the beginning of the chapter,
we outlined how we realized the re-allocation algorithms for activities and resources and later on
described the architecture and main layers of the prototype.
Finally, we discussed the gained results for the sample scenario case which was described in
Section 6.5. We demonstrated that the representation of workarounds, such as replacing an employee
with another, can be outlined by our approach.
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Part III
The Meta model
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Open Models
“ Things should be made as simple as possible, but not any simpler.
ALBERT EINSTEIN
The Open Model Initiative (OMI) has the objective to establish a community that “ ... deals with
the creation, maintenance, modification, distribution, and analysis of models”[71]. The platform
provided by the initiative enables the creation and use of a variety of models and is not limited to any
concrete research area. The model presented in this thesis is available as a project in the information
security community of the Open Model Initiative [100].
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8.1 Extended Business Process Elements
In this section, we provide details about the basic elements of our process language. The components
used are mainly derived from the business process model described in [67, p. 13]. Some components
have been slightly adapted in order to suit our needs. Figure 8.1 schematically outlines the relations
between the modeling entities.
Figure 8.1: Business process model derived from [67, p. 13]
Process: The process element contains all essential information on an abstract level. This
component is mainly used later on in adapted process maps which outline the dependencies both,
under normal and emergency conditions.
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Table 8.1: Attributes of a process element within the meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
ID Integer M a unique identifier in order to enable
simulation operations and analyzing steps
NAME String M a readable name for the process. It is
recommended to keep this name unique.
FINANCIAL VALUE Enumeration C a qualitative description (i.e. negligible, low,
medium, high, very high) of the financial
value of the process
STRATEGIC VALUE Enumeration C a qualitative description (i.e. negligible, low,
medium, high, very high) of the strategic
value of the process
SPECIAL TIME
PERIODS
Table C this table specifies peak periods within the
process (e.g. summer season, Christmas
trading)
INTERRUPTIBLE Enumeration C this gives important information whether
preemptive or non-preemptive approaches
should be used scheduling. The default option
is set to yes.
CUSTOMER
INTERFACE
Enumeration C This attribute provides information whether
the process has a direct interface to the
customer. This is important as activities
that have a high customer visibility are more
likely to cause negative impacts on brand and
reputation. Default is set to “No”. Other
options comprise key accounts, accounts or
shareholder/partner.
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KEY CUSTOMERS Longstring C this attribute describes the customers that
are targeted by the process. As business
continuity responses may vary corresponding
to the customer group, this information can
improve the response planning.
KEY INFORMATION Longstring C describes the key information assets
KEY APPLICATIONS Longstring C this attribute provides information in a
verbose form about key applications used in
the process. This information is essential for
a first high-level analysis and for specifying
the scope for further analysis steps.
KEY SUPPLIER Longstring C this attribute provides details about essential
supplier. For a comprehensive integration of
supply risk aspects and service level analysis,
we kindly refer to [59]
RTO Time C According to the German Federal Office
for Information Security the“... recovery
time objective (RTO) specifies the time
in which the process is intended to be
recovered.”[12, p. 45]. In our model, this
time-period is relevant for analyzing whether
the process can be finished within the required
time-frame.
MTPD Time C The maximum tolerable period of disruption
defines the time span during which a process
can be interrupted or unavailable before the
company becomes damaged irreversibly. [16,
p.13]
CONFIDENTIALITY
THRESHOLD
Float M A float number between 0 and 1 indicating
the level of confidentiality that has to be
guaranteed.
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INTEGRITY
THRESHOLD
Float M A float number between 0 and 1 indicating the
level of integrity that has to be guaranteed.
AVAILABILITY
THRESHOLD
Float M A float number between 0 and 1 indicating the
level of availability that has to be guaranteed.
CONFIDENTIALITY Float M current level of confidentiality
INTEGRITY Float M current level of integrity
AVAILABILITY Float M current level of availability
PROCESS OWNER Interref C reference to an employee of the resource
model
COMMENT String C A comment for verbal description of the
process.
8.1.1 Flow elements
The flow elements have been mainly derived from the ADOxx Default Library. Therefore, in the
following only a short description of the different flow elements is outlined.
Start: The start element has to occur exactly once in a business process. Because of this
characteristic, we capture information that is valid for the whole process within our model in this
specific component.
Fork: This component can be used to represent a parallel process flow.
Join: The join element has the purpose to merge parallel flows into sequential flows. It is
important to mention that this element is also responsible to get the flows ’synchronized’ before the
process flow continues.
Decision: The decision component enables the representation of alternative task flows. The flow
can be either influenced by a random variable or by attribute / variable conditions (e.g. stock > 50).
End: The end block indicates a possible process end.
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8.1.2 Task elements
Sub-process: Processes can reach a rather high complexity. For that reason it can be useful to
use subprocesses in order to break down the complexity per layer. From a modeler’s perspective a
subprocess can be seen as a normal process that can be integrated into another process model.
Activity: “An activity represents a unit of work performed by a user, system or partner. An
activity may have some input and output and some associated actions (pre and post activity).”[30,
p.2] For our purpose, an activity has to be described by the following attributes:
Table 8.2: Attributes of an activity within the meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
ID Integer M a unique identifier in order to enable
simulation operations and analyzing steps
NAME String M a readable name for the task. Has not to be
unique.
COMPLETION
FUNCTION
Longstring M a completion function describing the degree
of completion related to time [101, p.8]
EXECUTION COSTS Longstring M specifies the costs that arise when performing
the activity
EXECUTION TIME Time M provides information about the time that is
needed to fulfill the task.
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INTERRUPTIBLE Enumeration M an attribute specifying whether the activity
can be interrupted during execution (e.g.
the review of a document can be easily
interrupted and resumed at a later point in
time without mentionable delays; on the other
hand, the interruptions of some chemical
tasks performed in a laboratory have to be
carried out as a whole - otherwise the activity
has to be restarted from the beginning). This
value is of high importance when it comes to
resource re-allocations. The default value is
set to yes.
RTO Time C According to the German Federal Office for
Information Security the“... recovery time
objective (RTO) specifies the time in which
the process is intended to be recovered.”[12,
p. 45]. In our model this time-period is
relevant for analyzing whether tasks can be
resumed within the planned time-frame.
MTPD Time C The maximum tolerable period of disruption
defines the time span during which an
activity or service can be interrupted or
unavailable before the company becomes
damaged irreversibly. [16, p.13] In all design
plans, special attention should be paid to not
exceed this value.
CONFIDENTIALITY
THRESHOLD
Float M A float number between 0 and 1 indicating
the level of confidentiality that has to be
guaranteed.
INTEGRITY
THRESHOLD
Float M A float number between 0 and 1 indicating the
level of integrity that has to be guaranteed.
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AVAILABILITY
THRESHOLD
Float M A float number between 0 and 1 indicating the
level of availability that has to be guaranteed.
CONFIDENTIALITY Float M current level of confidentiality
INTEGRITY Float M current level of integrity
AVAILABILITY Float M current level of availability
RESPONSIBLE Interref C reference to a human resource or an
organizational unit
CUSTOMER
INTERFACE
Enumeration C This attribute provides information whether
the activity has a direct interface to the
customer. This is important as activities
that have a high customer visibility are more
likely to cause negative impacts on brand and
reputation. Default is set to “No”.
ACTIVITY
RE-ALLOCATION
RULE
Expression C Contains a re-allocation rule for an activity.
The expression has to be formed as outlined in
the formal model. Activity re-allocations can
be seen as workarounds such as performing
an automatic task manually. A typical
example would be the processing of purchase
orders. If the server for automatically
providing a server is not available, a
workaround could take new purchase orders
by telephone.
COMMENT String C A comment for verbal description of the
activity.
8.1.3 Resource elements
The determination of value is a challenging task. A variety of factors exist that can be taken into
consideration, such as the value that would be assigned by owners or users, the value competitors
would pay for, replacement costs, acquisition costs, strategic value.[45, pp.86-87]
Resource:
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Table 8.3: Attributes of a resource within the meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
ID Integer M a unique identifier in order to enable
simulation operations and analyzing steps
NAME String M a readable name for the task. Has not to be
unique.
COSTS Float C can be used either as an aggregated view on
all costs or for other costs which do not fall
into the categories acquisition, configuration,
maintenance or replacement
ACQUISITION COSTS Float C specifies the amount of money that was
necessary to buy the resource
CONFIGURATION
COSTS
Float C the amount of money needed to configure the
resource
MAINTENANCE
COSTS
Float C the costs of ongoing maintenance (per year)
REPLACEMENT
COSTS
Float M the costs of replacement
REPLACEMENT
TIME
Time M specifies the time in which the resource can
be replaced
RECOVER
COMPLEXITY
Enumeration M this attribute indicates whether a resource can
be recovered if destroyed. Further it specifies
in qualitative terms how complex a recovery
of the resource would be.
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RTO Time C According to the German Federal Office for
Information Security, the“... recovery time
objective (RTO) specifies the time in which
the process is intended to be recovered.”[12,
p. 45]. In our model, this time-period is
relevant for analyzing whether tasks can be
resumed within the planned time-frame.
MTPD Time C The maximum tolerable period of disruption
defines the time span during which an
activity or service can be interrupted or
unavailable before the company becomes
damaged irreversibly. [16, p.13]
MTTR Time C mean time to repair
MTBF Time C mean time between failure
CONFIDENTIALITY
THRESHOLD
Float M A float number between 0 and 1 indicating
the level of confidentiality that has to be
guaranteed.
INTEGRITY
THRESHOLD
Float M A float number between 0 and 1 indicating the
level of integrity that has to be guaranteed.
AVAILABILITY
THRESHOLD
Float M A float number between 0 and 1 indicating the
level of availability that has to be guaranteed.
CONFIDENTIALITY Float M current level of confidentiality
INTEGRITY Float M current level of integrity
AVAILABILITY Float M current level of availability
OWNER Interref C reference to a human resource
RESTORATION
DEPENDENCY
Longstring C specifies which other assets have to be in
place before the resource can be functional
again.
COMMENT String C A comment for verbal description of the
resource.
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RESOURCE
RE-ALLOCATION
RULE
Expression C This element is solely for the re-allocation
of resources. The expression within this
field should at least consist of a Resource
Attribute, Relational Operator, Threshold,
Time Interval, Possible Replacement Options.
For further details on the structure we kindly
refer the reader to the formal model.
Employee: Beside the attributes mentioned in Table 8.3, the following characteristics are
represented in our model.
Table 8.4: Attributes of a human resource element within the
meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
SKILL SET Record C within our model it is possible to assign
skills to human resources. This is especially
useful for our resource allocation capabilities
as resources with the similar skill set may
carry out the same tasks as a deputy in the
event of an emergency.
SECURITY
CLEARANCES
Record C in order to analyze whether certain allocations
might be feasible from an information
perspective, it is essential to know the
clearances of an employee. If this information
is not available, security deficiencies could
arise. For detailed information about
clearances, we kindly refer the reader to [107]
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WORKING
SCHEDULE
Record C as human resources are only allowed to
perform their tasks during working hours.
Therefore this attribute specifies the standard
working hours. Apart from that, compulsory
or voluntary overtime hours can be defined.
Premise:
Table 8.5: Attributes of a physical resource element within the
meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
LOCATION String C indicates where the physical resource is
located (e.g., Vienna, Austria)
CLASSIFICATION String C provides information about the classification
of a room, premise or any other physical
location
IT System:
Table 8.6: Attributes of a technical resource element within the
meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
CUSTODIAN Interref C the responsible person to safeguard the asset
CLASSIFICATION Enumeration C provides information about the classification
of the asset
Information resource:
Simon Tjoa, 9708080 91
Table 8.7: Attributes of an information resource element within
the meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
CLASSIFICATION String C provides information about the classification
of the asset
CUSTODIAN Interref C the responsible employee to safeguard the
asset
USED IT SYSTEMS Interref C indicates what systems are needed to access,
store, distribute, dispose, ... the information
RPO TIME C “ The target set for the status and availability
of data [...] at the start of a recovery
process.”[16, p.14]
MTDL TIME C “The maximum loss of information [...]
which an organization can tolerate.”[16, p.13]
STRATEGIC VALUE Enumeration C indicates the strategic value of the
information in qualitative terms
LOSS OF
KNOWLEDGE
Enumeration C this attribute provides information (qualitative
scale) about the knowledge loss that could
result if the information asset gets destroyed.
Resource relation:
Table 8.8: Attributes of a resource relation element within the
meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
ID Integer M a unique identifier in order to enable
simulation operations and analyzing steps
NAME String M a readable name for the element. Default is
set to empty string ’ ’.
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TYPE Enumeration M can be either an ’AND’ or an ’OR’ relation.
Default is set to ’AND’.
IS START RELATION Enumeration M indicates whether the relation is the root of a
specific resource relation.
Furthermore, to represent the organizational structure and to provide a high level overview of the
organization’s risk situation, the following elements are introduced:
Organizational unit: describes an organization or a part of an organization such as a department
Role: describes a role that an employee can fulfill
Business Objective: provides information about the aims of an organization
Business Impact: assesses the impacts of a loss of availability, integrity or confidentiality on a
high level
Impact Scale: defines the scale and categories in which impacts should be captured
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8.2 Extensions Enabling the Consideration of Risk Aspects
Figure 8.2 schematically outlines the relations between the main components of the Threat /
Countermeasure Model which has evolved from [64, 60, 43, 102]
Figure 8.2: Threat / Countermeasure Model
Measure:
Table 8.9: Attributes of a measure element within the meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
ID Integer M a unique identifier in order to enable
simulation operations and analyzing steps
NAME String M a readable name for the element. Default is
set to empty string ’ ’.
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COSTS Float C specifies the aggregated costs or other costs
which are not separately mentioned
ACQUISITION COSTS Float C specifies the amount of money that was
necessary to buy the measure
CONFIGURATION
COSTS
Float C the amount of money needed to implement
and configure the resource
MAINTENANCE
COSTS
Float C the costs of ongoing maintenance (per year)
CONFIDENCE Enumeration C indicates the confidence level of information
COMMENT String C A comment for verbal description of the
measure.
Preventive Measure:
In this thesis, a preventive measure is a measure that reduces the probability of occurrence of a threat.
An example is the use of flame-resistant textiles to reduce the probability of a fire threat.
Blocking Measure:
Blocking measures are safeguards that can immediately resolve a threat. An example of this type of
measure is a malware filter.
Reactive Measure:
Reactive measures pursue the aim to model and simulate more complex and realistic measures. The
three types of reactive measures are Detection Measure, Counter Measure and Recovery Measure.
These types reflect the necessary phases to fight a threat.
Threat:
A threat can be described as something causing harm or damage to a resource or process. In our
model, a threat is represented by the following attributes.
Table 8.10: Attributes of a threat element within the meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
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ID Integer M a unique identifier in order to enable
simulation operations and analyzing steps
NAME String M a readable name for the element. Default is
set to empty string ’ ’.
INTERVAL TIME C the time interval in which the threat occurs
PROBABILITY Float C the corresponding probability to the interval
CONFIDENCE Enumeration C indicates the confidence level of information
COMMENT String C A comment for verbal description of the
measure.
Impact:
As a threat causes damage, an impact arises. In our model the impact is described by a function that
negatively affects an attribute of a resource.
Table 8.11: Attributes of a threat element within the meta-model
Name Type M/C Description
ID Integer M a unique identifier in order to enable
simulation operations and analyzing steps
NAME String M a readable name for the element. Default is
set to empty string ’ ’.
IMPACT FUNCTION Expression C the impact function of a threat
RESOURCE
ATTRIBUTE
String C the resource attribute that is impacted
CONFIDENCE Enumeration C indicates the confidence of information
COMMENT String C A comment for verbal description of the
measure.
Resource:
The resource element contains an interref to an existing resource within the resource model.
Relations
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The relation classes of the model describe how measures interact with threats as well as how a
recovery measure restores the functionality of a resource.
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8.3 Open Models Prototype
In this section we outline how our meta-model can be applied to facilitate the business continuity
lifecycle. The presented implementation of the above-mentioned metamodel shall serve on the one
hand as a toolkit for BCM / BR practitioners and on the other hand capture all the necessary data
to conduct the planning of workarounds based on the formal model presented in the previous sections.
The central documents that have been considered when designing and evaluating the approach
were frequently used and well-known BCM standards and best practices, especially BSI 100-4 [12],
BS25999 [10, 11] and the BCI GPG [16]. Furthermore, the ADONIS modeling language has been a
valuable input for deriving our model.
The starting point for our approach is the definition of the organization’s structure. In our
approach, this is performed via an adapted organization chart (RABPM Organization Model).
The reason for this choice as the origin of our analysis steps is the high importance of an initial
understanding of the importance and pertinence of individual parts of the company.
Beside the typical components of an organization chart, such as organizational units,
roles/positions and employees, our organization chart holds information about the corresponding
high level business objectives, impact categories (e.g. life/safety, finance, environment, reputation,
. . . ) as well as likelihood and impact scales (i.e. what does a damage/harm of negligible, low,
medium, high and very high mean for the impact categories). The determination of the core
objectives is vital as all security ambitions shall support a business objective. The aims of a
business or business unit strongly depend on the nature of the organization (e.g. non-profit vs
profit-oriented organizations). Examples of typical business objectives are sales growth, extension of
the product line-up or increase in market share. As described before, it is advantageous if the goals
are described in a specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time bound (SMART) way (see [76]).
The likelihood and impact criteria are of high importance for the consistent analysis across whole
organizations. For more information about risk criteria, we kindly refer to [4].
The following screenshot (Figure 8.3) highlights how our approach can be modeled using the
OpenModels platform. In the figure one can see the organizational structure, the objective of the
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company and a first high-level picture about possible business impacts when loosing availability,
integrity or confidentiality.
Figure 8.3: Prototype Screenshot: RABPM Organization Model with Notebook of Impact
Scale Object
Within our model, business objectives are only described in a verbose manner. However, a
beneficial extension of the model could be the design of a specific model with the aim to model
business objectives in a comprehensive and consistent way ensuring at least the above-mentioned
(SMART) attributes.
The process dependency model of our approach is similar to a process map with the special
characteristic of highlighting the dependencies - under normal as well as under emergency conditions
- between the processes. The consideration of dependencies under emergency conditions is of high
importance for business continuity response. In addtion to the information about interdependencies
and dependencies, the diagram provides information about the strategic, operational and financial
value of a process on a high level. Furthermore, aspects such as process responsibilities, special
time periods/peak periods and a high-level description of supply dependencies are captured by the
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diagram. For a closer look on risk-aware business process management and supply risk management
we refer to [59].
Figure 8.4 shows a simple sample case for such a process dependency model. This model can
also be used to define the initial scope of a BCM project.
Figure 8.4: Process Dependency Model
The business process model is the core component of business process management. It specifies
the structure of a process. This comprises information on all activities as well as flow information such
as information whether specific activities can be executed in parallel or information about decisions
influencing the process flow. Figure 8.5 depicts a process model for the sample process presented in
the previous Section 6.5.
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Figure 8.5: Process Model
In order to perform activities, resources are required. Therefore, we introduce our resource
model which can be linked to activities. The resource model mainly consists of resource relations
(i.e. AND relation / OR relation) as well as resources (i.e. Generic Resource, Employees, Premises,
IT-Systems, Information Assets). In order to link the elements, we introduce two connectors. A
complex connector that establishes the link between resource relations (purple connector) and
a connector that links resource relations with resources (green connector). Figure 8.6 shows a
corresponding resource model for the sample case.
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Figure 8.6: Resource Relation Model
The last model to outline is the threat model. It provides details about a threat and its
interdependencies with safeguards. The safeguarding elements can be divided into preventive
measures (reducing the occurrence probability), blocking measures (eliminating the effects of a
threat) as well as reactive measures (detecting and counteracting a threat as well as recovering
damaged resources). As a threat can have multiple impacts on multiple resources and their
corresponding attributes, we introduce an impact component.
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Figure 8.7: Threat Model
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8.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we presented our OpenModels metamodel. We outlined the extensions and
modifications required to a) facilitate the planning of workarounds and b) to support the
methodological approach presented in the previous chapters of this thesis (see Section 6.1).
In the second part of this chapter, we presented the prototype implementation in OpenModels.
Interested readers are welcome to download and adapt our approach at the Information
Security Project Page of OpenModels (Project Risk Aware Business Process Management -
http://www.openmodels.at/web/informationsecurity/home).
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Part IV
Conclusion
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Summary of major contributions,
conclusions and indications for further
work
“ There are two sides to every question.
PROTAGORAS
Incidents, crises and catastrophes are omnipresent in our daily headlines. Examples for such
negative events are natural disasters (e.g. July floods in the UK in 2007, volcano Eyjafjallajoekull
in 2010, earthquakes and tsunami in Japan in 2011), critical failures (e.g. power outages such as
East Florida February in 2008), terrorist attacks (e.g. assault on the Atocha railway station in 2004,
terrorist attacks on World Trade Center in 2001), data theft (e.g. Royal Navy 2008, Austrian Ministry
of Justice 2005) or targeted attacks (e.g. Stuxnet).
Besides the incidents presented by the media, a huge variety of less spectacular threats exists
that endangers the existence of companies. Examples of such threats are loss of key staff, loss of
knowledge, disgruntled employees, insider threats or software failures. According to [49, 15], the
vast majority of the crises affecting organizations are so called ’quiet catastrophes’ which are not
reported by the media.
Business continuity pursues the aim to improve the resilience of organizations regardless of the
negative event. Our focus lies on the design and implementation of robust structures that ensure
proper response for large-scale incidents.
Various survey highlighted the importance of the subject. A survey conducted by the CMI states
that “... 71 per cent of respondents claim that BCM is regarded as ’important’ or ’very important’ by
senior management in their organisation ... ” [113, p.7]
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Business continuity has its origins in the area of information technology. Today a trend can
be seen from disaster recovery to an emerging discipline called “business resilience” which has a
broader focus and concentrates on all areas of an organization. Elliot et al. [33] describe the reasons
for this development as follows: “Organisations are socio-technical systems, and to manage them
effectively for continuity, all elements must be considered” [33, p.3]
The key research questions answered by this thesis are:
How can a method and/or framework combine security disciplines (such as business continuity)
with business process management?
How can this framework improve the planning phase of business continuity and security
incident management by evaluating dynamic allocations of resources? What techniques are
necessary to achieve this support?
The approach presented in this thesis contributes to the above-mentioned challenge by providing
a common modeling language for business analysts, process owners, security and continuity experts.
The methodological approach assists continuity practitioners to build and maintain a business
continuity management system. Risk-aware business process management is used as the foundation.
The combination of modeling and simulation of business processes and security aspects (i.e. threats
and detective, corrective and preventive countermeasures) enables the identification of mission
critical resources, services, processes and dependencies. This distinction is of high importance as it
is not feasible to secure all resources, services and processes to the same extent.
The extension of resource allocation modeling capabilities makes it possible to support the
planning of workarounds and continuity responses. The usage of simulation can provide important
background information for decision support on the effects of plans and measures such as cross-skill
trainings. In order to improve the usability of the approach, we implemented our metamodel which
supports the steps required to conduct this analysis (e.g. to get an initial understanding about
dependencies amongst business processes, modeling threats, ...)
The core results of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
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A review of the state of the art: Within our literature review we firstly present several
approaches focusing on the integration of security, risk and continuity aspects with business
process management. This reflection on the one hand, supplies the reader with all necessary
information required to have a good overview of the domain of risk aware business process
management. On the other hand, the literature evaluation allows the reader to get an initial
overview regarding business continuity planning and resource allocation strategies.
An approach combining both, the business process management and business continuity
perspective: In this thesis we show how concepts such as the BCM life cycle and the BPMS
paradigm can be linked to generate an added value for the different target groups (e.g. business
analysts, security analysts, ...) within an organization. This organizational consideration
highlights how the approach fits into existing structures and is fundamental for the success
of the method.
A formal model that builds the foundation for our resource re-allocation considerations: The
mathematical formulation of our conceptual model serves as a basis for our simulations. This
solid foundation is essential to build reliable, understandable and comprehensible models.
Furthermore, this specification facilitates the exchange within the research community.
A Simulink prototype evaluating our formal model: The prototype artifact generated in this
thesis provides details how an implementation of our formal model can be achieved using the
widely-used software package Simulink.
A metamodel: As the success of the whole approach depends on the acceptance of the users,
we decided to build a metamodel that extends the formal model with information required by
business analysts and continuity specialists. By introducing this metamodel we improve the
usability and acceptance of the approach.
Implementation of the metamodel in the OpenModels platform: The implementation of the
metamodel within the OpenModels platform pursues the aim to allow a broad audience to
use and access the created metamodel. This helps to disseminate the results achieved by
this thesis. Furthermore, the decision to make the metamodel available through this platform
allows research groups and practitioners to make their own adjustments where necessary and
to eliminate existing limitations if required.
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Currently, the major limitation of the approach is the high payload which is initially required
in order to get meaningful results. Without the right level of modeling granularity, only results
that provide a rough overview can be achieved. Such a high level may be sufficient for some first
evaluation of the risk and impacts, but not for detailed planning of action.
Another challenge which remains unsolved is the estimation of probabilities of occurrence
and the behavior of different risks. This is not a specific problem of the approach, but good risk
estimations would considerably help to improve the final results of the approach.
The interdisciplinary field of business process management combined with security and business
continuity has a huge range. We were obviously not able to tackle all relevant issues in this thesis.
Therefore in the following paragraphs we will highlight further research areas that could be addressed
to take the presented approach one step further.
One essential area of research would be the extension of the current modeling and simulation
capabilities for risk analysis in critical infrastructure. The special characteristic of this research areas
is that a special focus has to be laid on inter- and intra-domain interdependencies and dependencies.
Another important future work is the development of a comprehensive and common tool
supporting the method. Currently, only extended proof-of-concept prototypes exist which were
developed to evaluate our approach and test its feasibility. However, integrating the simulation
capabilities into the OpenModel prototype and providing comprehensive report capabilities would
help to improve usability and applicability.
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